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Outline
This thesis deals with several theoretical subjects about optimal fiscal and gov-
ernment policy. It contains my four works about tax and other redistributive policy,
starting with the general introductory survey as the first chapter.
Chapter 2 compares ad-valorem and specific taxation in models where a represen-
tative consumer with an exogenous income has both a quality and a quantity choice
under perfect competition. In the setting, while ad-valorem tax causes income effect
only, specific tax causes both income effect and substitution effect. Therefore, ad-
valorem tax decreases consumer demand for both quality and quantity; on the other
hand, specific tax decreases consumer demand for quantity. However, the sign of con-
sumer demand for quality is ambiguous and is determined by the curvature of marginal
utility on quantity. Additionally, using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
function and a linear price function, we show that ad-valorem tax is superior to specific
tax except for the Leontief preference under which the two forms of commodity taxes
generate the same tax revenue. The substitution effect caused by specific tax disappears
if the elasticity of substitution converges to zero.
In Chapter 3, We examine optimal taxation and public good provision by a gov-
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ernment which takes reduction of envy into consideration as one of the constraints.
We adopt the notion of extended envy-freeness proposed by Diamantaras and Thom-
son (1990), called λ-equitability. We derive the modified Samuelson rule at an op-
timum income tax, and show that, using a constant elasticity of substitution utility
function, the direction of distorting the original Samuelson rule to relax λ envy free
constraints is crucially determined by the elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, we
numerically show that the level of public good increases (or decreases) in the degree of
envy-freeness when the provision level is upwardly (or downwardly) distorted. Also,
Chapter 4 covers the topic of public good provision under income transfer under that
ethical constraint, but allows the social planner to set the surcharge fee for the purpose
of excluding some agents whereas we simplify their income as exogenous one (or ini-
tial wealth). In this chapter, we study optimal public good provision and user fee in
order to exclude some agents by Rawlsian or utilitarian government under lump-sum
transfer, constrained by reduction of envy. In particular, we employ the exclusion tech-
nique used in Hellwig (2005), i.e., the policymaker decides the level of provision and
surcharge fee paid by those making access to it, as well as uniform transfer. Different
from Hellwig (2005), we introduce heterogeneity in initial wealth for agents and the
envy-free constraint with respect to their one, but not to their tastes for public good.
In this setting, we derive the optimal provision level and user fee, and compared to
those in Hellwig (2005), for Rawlsian government, the up-charge is lower than the one
derived in Hellwig (2005) in order to reduce the envy.
Chapter 5 studies optimal nonlinear income tax schedule at symmetric equilibria at
which two symmetric states (or tax authorities) compete in order to attract more tax-
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payers from the opposite. It is different from the existing papers that taxpayers’ wage
are endogenously determined by production technology. The optimal tax schedule
embraces not only migration effect, but also trickle-down effect coming from endoge-
nous wage, and the migration effect stimulates the trickle-down effect. Compared to
previous works, the threat of emigration never disappears in marginal tax rate for high-
skilled workers because emigration terms are embedded in the production and such
factors have impacts on the productivities or their unit wages.
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This thesis consists of four independent chapters which are linked in contribution
to the theory of public economics. Chapter 2 studies the problem of tax incidence
and welfare comparison between ad-valorem tax and specific tax, and all the other
chapters are based on the assumption that agents are privately informed about their
preferences and wages, and use mechanism design theory. Chapter 3 and 4 study public
good provision under nonlinear income tax by a government considering reduction of
envy among taxpayers, and Chapter 5 uses common agency model under asymmetric
information and studies nonlinear income tax under strategic situations, which mean
that two symmetric tax authorities attract mobile workers with differential mobile costs
in order to collect more taxes.
As said before, topics of this thesis are categorized into the followings: tax inci-
dence, nonlinear income tax, public good provision (with or without exclusion) and tax
competition. According to existing literatures, Suits and Musgrave (1953) is the canon-
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ical work of tax incidence, which considers ad-valorem and specific tax incidence on
monopoly firm. The research question is to compare these two tax systems with re-
spect to price, quantity and profit under the same tax revenues in monopoly market. A
monopoly firm decides the quantity of product which determines its selling price per
unit and production cost. Under plausible assumptions, they show that under plausible
conditions, tax revenues by ad-valorem tax is greater than those by specific (or unit)
tax if its firm chooses the same quantity under these two tax systems. The intuition
is straightforward. Imagine switching from specific tax to ad-valorem tax where the
firm produces the same output as under that unit tax. Output tends to increase with
the change because such ad-valorem tax yields the quantity larger than that under spe-
cific tax. The price decreases as increasing the output, so the tax wedge between the
producer and consumers under is also decreasing since the final price is decreasing in
output. On the other hand, the tax wedge under specific tax is constant in output. There-
fore, consumer surplus and profit under ad-valorem tax are superior to those under the
other. In addition, increasing quantity leads to increasing before tax revenue until the
monopoly firm earns the maximized profit without any taxes. Therefore, tax revenue
by ad-valorem tax is also larger than that by unit tax. Delipalla and Keen (1992) also
study the tax incidence similar to the above and achieve consistent result to it, but they
include not only monopoly market, but also imperfect or perfect competitive market.
In addition, they compare ad-valorem tax, unit tax and the mix, but the tax authority
still heavily rely on ad-valorem tax according to their results. As the extensions, there
are papers which examine the tax incidence under imperfect competition, tax compe-
tition on capital income and two-sided market. For instance, see Skeath and Trandel
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(1994) and Anderson et al. (2001) for imperfect competition, Lockwood (2004) for tax
competition on capital income and Kind et al. (2008) for two-sided market.
Chapter 3 covers the topic of nonlinear income tax and public good provision, and
Chapter 5 considers nonlinear income tax competition among symmetric two coun-
tries. Mirrlees (1971) is the foundational work of optimal tax that suggests a way to
formalize the government’s problem dealing explicitly with unobserved heterogeneity.
The government can observe their labor income depending on ability and labor effort,
but it can observe neither ability nor labor effort. The objective of the government is to
maximize social welfare through income redistribution (i.e.,equity) without changing
individual behaviors (e.g., labor responses) which affect tax revenues (i.e., efficiency).
Contrary on the first-best environment, the unobserved heterogeneity implies that the
government cannot employ lump-sum tax, which leads to distortions. The infeasibility
of lump-sum tax stems from self-selection constraint to deter high-ability individuals
from mimicking low-ability ones. According to the revelation principle and taxation
principal which are the canonical mechanism design result, any optimal allocation can
be achieved through the tax system inducing high-ability taxpayers to reveal their true
types. Under the binding self-selection constraint, the government must rely on a dis-
tortionary nonlinear income tax to prevent high-ability from mimicking low-ability.
Hence, lump-sum tax is not available. From the fact, since the government cannot
implement the redistribution without distorting labor responses, equity and efficiency
tradeoff occurs in the Mirrleesian framework. Here, the following question appears:
how should the government design income tax schedules given equity and efficiency
tradeoff?
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Mirrlees (1971) characterizes the optimal marginal income tax rate formula under
a continuum of individuals who differ in skill levels. The most famous property of
optimal income tax schedules is that the optimal marginal tax rate must be nonnegative
and equal zero at the top and the bottom. Stiglitz (1982) studies the same problem
under two-class economy where all individuals have either high or low skill. This
employs principal-agent model, and adopts incentive compatibility as self-selection
constraint, and shows that at optimum, zero marginal tax rate for high-class and the
positive one for low class when the government wants to redistribute collected taxes
from high class to low class. Also, this paper derives all other cases: non-binding
incentive constraint for all and binding incentive constraint for low class only, and it
obtains that lump-sum tax is enough to achieve the optimal allocation in the former
case whereas zero marginal tax rate for low-class and negative marginal tax rate for
high-class implement the (constrained) best allocation in the latter case. However,
these properties are not relevant to practical policy design, and many papers studying
optimal fiscal policy with sufficient statistics approach emerged recently. Diamond
(1998) and Saez (2001) decompose the first-order condition in terms of optimal tax
rates into three terms, which is called ABC-formula in Diamond (1998), and clarifies
three key parameters that determine optimal tax rates: the taxable income elasticity,
the shape of the income distribution, and the social welfare weights. Therefore, the
optimal marginal income tax formula is described by real economic factors which can
be measured empirically.
The above studies assume that a government can set nonlinear income tax schedule,
but in reality, such policy is difficult due to administrative complexity. So, it’s natural
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to study the optimal structure of linear (commodity) taxation. The seminal contribution
is the paper of Ramsey (1927) that consider a situation in which the government can
only imposes taxes on commodities to collect a given amount of tax revenue. Ramsey
(1927) show that commodity taxation on a good should be imposed in inverse propor-
tion to the individual’s elasticity of demand for the good. This means that commodities
with inelastic demand are levied more heavily to minimize efficiency costs. Ramsey’s
formula is also formally identical to that obtained by Boiteux (1956) for the socially
optimal pricing of a budget-constrained multiproduct monopoly, which is sometimes
called the Ramsey-Boiteux formula. Corlett and Hague (1953) generalizes Ramsey’s
model for more general preferences. They consider a representative household that
consumes two goods and leisure. The government can tax the two goods, but not
leisure. The Corlett-Hague rule states that a good which is more complementary with
leisure should be taxed at a higher rate. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b) extends Ram-
sey’s result to an economy with several consumers who differ in their wages, but not
their preferences. In their analysis, we face a fundamental conflict between equity and
efficiency: goods with the lowest price elasticity of demand should have high tax rates
for the sake of efficiency, but they are also the ones with the lowest income elasticity
of demand that should be taxed leniently on equity grounds. An important result from
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) is the production efficiency theorem, which says that if
the optimal commodity tax system is in place, and if pure profits are all taxed away,3
production efficiency should apply for the economy as a whole.
Using the Mirrlees framework, Atkinson and Stern (1974) examines the optimal
mixed taxation when the government can employ both linear commodity taxation and
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nonlinear income taxation, called mixed taxation. In the mixed tax framework, the most
influential result is that of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976): when consumer preferences
are separable between goods and leisure, there is no need for differentiated commodity
tax rates. There have been many papers verifying the robustness of the canonical re-
sult. For instance, Cremer et al. (2001) shows that, when individuals differ in skills and
endowments, the Atkinson and Stiglitz Theorem is not robust because commodity tax-
ation creates positive effect of relaxing incentive compatibility constraints. Saez (2002)
shows that, under the heterogeneity in tastes for consumption goods, the Atkinson and
Stiglitz Theorem cannot be adapted if high income earners have a relatively higher
taste for this commodity. According to those results, individuals’ heterogeneity plays
an important role in breaking Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem. In another direction, Naito
(1999) introduces public production sector and endogenous wages, and shows that it
may be optimal for the tax authority to use as well a shadow price for skilled labor em-
ployed in the public production sector that is higher than its market price. Then, public
firms would demand less skilled labor reducing its relative wage and thus contributes
to redistributing incomes.
As mentioned above, most of papers about optimal labor income taxes assume that
individuals’ wages are exogenously fixed, but these volatilities are often seen in real
world, and lots of studies try to adopt the endogenous wages. Stiglitz (1982) and Stern
(1982) initiate its attempt in optimal income tax models, and obtain that taxpayers with
high wage face negative marginal tax rate whereas those with low wage face nega-
tive marginal tax rate whose absolute value is larger than that without its endogeneity.
Endogenous wages in optimal tax policies are related to analyses in Chapter 5.
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Not only levying any taxes but also providing public goods are important policies
for the government. Public goods will be under-provided by the market due to the free
rider problem caused by properties of public goods: non-excludability and non-rivalry.
From the reason, public economists are concerned with how the government should
design the optimal provision of public goods. Samuelson (1954) suggests the criterion
for providing public goods, which states that the optimal provision level equates the
sum of marginal willingness to pay for the public good to the marginal cost of pro-
viding the public good, which is called the Samuelson rule. However, this criterion is
derived under financing public good provision with non-distortionary taxation. Boad-
way and Keen (1993), which Chapter 3 and 4 are based on, integrates the theory of
public goods provision and the theory of optimal income taxation. In their model, the
role of the government is to mitigate income inequality through providing public good
and income redistribution by considering heterogeneous individuals in terms of innate
ability as in Mirrleesian economy. They show that the original Samuelson rule is valid
if both private consumption and public good are weakly separable with leisure. Gaube
(2005a) follows their work, and investigates conditions which increase or decrease the
level of public provision which may not correspond to the distortion of provision rule.
Bierbrauer (2009) and Bierbrauer (2014) study the similar model, but embed individ-
uals’ preference heterogeneity over public good and aggregate uncertainty about the
preferences from the point of a policymaker and take their mimicking their preferences
collectively into consideration. As another distortionary taxation, Atkinson and Stern
(1974) and Gaube (2000) study a Ramsey economy, where individuals are identical
and there is no lump-sum tax. They check Pigou (1947)’s claim: the existence of dis-
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tortionary taxes was a reason for not ”carrying public expenditures as far” as would
be done if we could apply the rule of equating marginal cost to marginal benefit of
individuals. Apart from public good provision financed by nonlinear income taxation,
there are many attempts to loose non-excludability in the context of public good pro-
vision. For instance, Moulin (1994), Schmitz (1997), Norman (2004) and Hellwig
(2005a) study public good provision by a government which has the ability to exclude
individuals from the enjoyment of a public good. In these papers, excludability is use-
ful because, in bargaining under incomplete information with voluntary participation,
the threat of individual exclusion makes participants more willing to contribute to the
financing of the public good.
In Chapter 3 and 4, we assume that the government is constrained on reduction of
envy among taxpayers. The notion of envy-free allocation introduced by Foley (1967),
which means that all agents have no envy toward the others’ consumption bundles, is
important to consider fairness in a economy. The central question is when Pareto effi-
cient and envy-free allocation exists. The fundamental conflict between efficiency and
equity was first observed by Kolm (1971), and Tadenuma (2002) proposed two con-
trasting principles to construct social preference relations. Also, how much an agent
prefers the other’s bundle is also important, and cardinality is necessary to check the in-
tensity of envy. The importance of cardinality was recognized by Feldman and Kirman
(1974) and Varian (1976b) when they took the utility difference between two individ-
uals as a cardinal measure of envy to construct social welfare functions. Introducing
the cardinality, Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1989) define the
weaker envy free notion, and Chapter 3 and 4 adopt it as one of constraints faced by
15
the government.
Tax competition is also related to Chapter 5 in this thesis. Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986) study capital income tax competition in a economy where
capital is mobile while workers are immobile. Following these works or ZMW model,
most of the literatures about tax competition assume that there is at least one fixed
factor. Apart from ZMW model, many papers have also studied optimal tax policy
with mobile workers. Early contributions to this literature include Wilson (1980) for
the case of linear taxation and Mirrlees (1982) for the case of nonlinear taxation. In
much of this literature, potential emigrants choose between the best labor-consumption
bundle available at home and some predetermined bundle or utility abroad. There is
a potential conflict between a government’s desire to tax on the basis of ability to pay
and the possibility that more able individuals might emigrate to avoid high tax burdens.
Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) consider a political economy model of competition be-
tween a large number of small countries when there are two skill types and only one of
them is mobile.The objective function of each government is determined by majority
rule, with the consequence that it wants to maximize the utility of the type of indi-
vidual who is in the majority. Piaser (2007) studies nonlinear income tax competition
by two benevolent governments in the presence of labor mobility, but in a model with
only two skills, and Morelli et al. (2012a) also studies the same problem except for
three types in a model. This enables us to study the government’s choice of constitu-
tion: integrated one or independent one. Lehmann et al. (2014) also studies nonlinear
income tax competition by two Rawlsian governments when workers are mobile and
type spaces for wage as well as commuting cost are continuous.Contrary to these re-
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searches, Bierbrauer et al. (2013) assumes that workers are perfectly mobile without
any costs, and study nonlinear income tax competition.
Each chapter in this dissertation contributes to the literature on theoretical subjects
about tax and other redistributive policy. Chapter 2 compares ad-valorem and specific
taxation in models where a representative consumer with an exogenous income has
both a quality and a quantity choice under perfect competition. In the setting, while
ad-valorem tax causes income effect only, specific tax causes both income effect and
substitution effect. Therefore, ad-valorem tax decreases consumer demand for both
quality and quantity; on the other hand, specific tax decreases consumer demand for
quantity. However, the sign of consumer demand for quality is ambiguous and is deter-
mined by the curvature of marginal utility on quantity. Additionally, using a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function and a linear price function, we show
that ad-valorem tax is superior to specific tax except for the Leontief preference under
which the two forms of commodity taxes generate the same tax revenue. The substitu-
tion effect caused by specific tax disappears if the elasticity of substitution converges
to zero.
In Chapter 3, We examine optimal taxation and public good provision by a govern-
ment which takes reduction of envy into consideration as one of the constraints. We
adopt the notion of extended envy-freeness proposed by Diamantaras and Thomson
(1989), called λ-equitability. We derive the modified Samuelson rule at an optimum
income tax, and show that, using a constant elasticity of substitution utility function,
the direction of distorting the original Samuelson rule to relax λ envy free constraints
is crucially determined by the elasticity of substitution. Also, Chapter 4 covers the
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topic of public good provision under income transfer under that ethical constraint, but
allows the social planner to set the surcharge fee for the purpose of excluding some
agents whereas we simplify their income as exogenous one (or initial wealth). In this
chapter, we study optimal public good provision and user fee in order to exclude some
agents by Rawlsian or utilitarian government under lump-sum transfer, constrained by
reduction of envy. In particular, we employ the exclusion technique used in Hellwig
(2005a), i.e., the policymaker decides the level of provision and surcharge fee paid by
those making access to it, as well as uniform transfer. In this setting, we derive the
optimal provision level and user fee, and compared to those in Hellwig (2005a), for
Rawlsian government, the up-charge is lower than the one derived in Hellwig (2005a)
in order to reduce the envy.
Chapter 5 studies optimal nonlinear income tax schedule at symmetric equilibria at
which two symmetric states (or tax authorities) compete in order to attract more tax-
payers from the opposite. It is different from the existing papers that taxpayers’ wage
are endogenously determined by production technology. The optimal tax schedule
embraces not only migration effect, but also trickle-down effect coming from endoge-
nous wage, and the migration effect stimulates the trickle-down effect. Compared to
previous works, the threat of emigration never disappears in marginal tax rate for high-
skilled workers because emigration terms are embedded in the production and such
factors have impacts on the productivities or their unit wages.
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Chapter 2
The Welfare Comparison of
Ad-valorem Tax and Specific
Tax with Both Quality and
Quantity Choice of a Consumer
2.1 Introduction
In the field of public finance, there are many studies that compare social welfare
under ad-valorem and specific taxation. The seminal contribution of Suits and Mus-
grave (1953) examines the impact of two different tax structures on welfare keeping
19
the same tax revenue under a monopoly market. The author shows that an ad-valorem
tax is superior to a specific tax. Some works that approach the comparison under im-
perfect competition support the conclusion (see Delipalla and Keen (1992), Skeath and
Trandel (1994), Myles (1996), Denicoló and Matteuzzi (2000), Anderson et al. (2001)
and Aiura and Ogawa (2013)).
However, these studies ignore the impact of the tax structure on the product quality
selected by firms. If both forms of taxation affect the quality, wholly specific taxation
can be optimal under perfect competition (see Kay and Keen (1983, 1991) and Deli-
palla and Keen (2006)). To cover the cost of improving quality, the increment in tax
revenue under specific tax is less than the increment under ad-valorem tax because of
the “multiplier effect.”
Our aim in this paper is to compare the two forms of commodity taxation in terms
of welfare when the consumer has both a quantity and a quality choice under perfect
competition. Contrary to the aforementioned literature, we assume that a representative
consumer, not firms, determines product quality provided under a perfect competition
market. In other words, a given good/service is available to the consumer at different
quality levels. In the setting, there are two margins of choice for the consumer: qual-
ity choice and quantity choice. At the quality choice margin, the consumer chooses a
degree of excellence of the good/service. At the quantity choice margin, the consumer
determines the amount of the good/service given the quality. Imagine a situation in
which the consumer can choose not only the number of hours that his parents are at
the elderly care center but also the quality of the facility. Both quality and quantity
affect utility, but a crucial difference is that quality choice positively affects the unit
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price because it is quite natural that the higher quality he chooses, the more he pays
the unit price. The basic structure of our model is close to the Bastani et al. (2016)
model. The authors study optimal ad-valorem and specific taxation as well as nonlin-
ear income taxation, but our setting and concern differ from Bastani et al. (2016). The
study investigates the two forms of commodity taxation under nonlinear labor income
taxes when individuals have different productivity, and there is asymmetric information
between the policymaker and taxpayers with respect to individuals’ productivity. Both
consumption taxes play a crucial role in relaxing incentive constraints, thus, such taxes
are necessary to implement the second-best allocation, which contradicts the canonical
results provided by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Contrary to their paper, we allow
the government to levy taxes on such consumption only and assume homogeneous
individuals, that is, there is no asymmetric information. Instead of studying the link-
age between commodity taxes and relaxing incentive constraints on income taxes, we
present the welfare comparison between an ad-valorem and a specific tax in the sense
of taxpayer’s utility and the response in the change of each tax rate using the com-
parative statics analysis. Additionally, ? is related to our paper and studies consumer
behavior when the consumer can choose both quality and quantity; however, the cited
paper does not study tax incidence.
We find that specific taxation distorts the consumer’s choice between quantity and
quality, whereas introducing ad-valorem taxation does not affect the choice. In other
words, while the marginal rate of substitution between a quantity and a quality includes
the tax rate under specific tax, the corresponding marginal rate of substitution does not
include the tax rate under an ad-valorem tax. The unit tax rate makes the consumer
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reluctant to purchase more, whereas he is willing to improve the quality to compensate
for lost utility. Subsequently, assuming that a price function is linear and individual
preference is expressed by the constant elasticity of the substitution (CES) utility func-
tion, we analytically show that an ad-valorem tax is superior to a specific tax in the
presence of a substitution effect, if any. The difference in indirect utilities between
ad-valorem tax and specific tax decreases as the elasticity of substitution decreases; the
two forms of taxation are equivalent when consumers have Leontief preference. The
findings imply that the substitution effect under a specific tax plays an important role
in ad-valorem tax dominating a specific tax in terms of consumer welfare.
The next section describes our abstract model with assumptions guaranteeing the
existence of an optimal solution for a representative consumer. Section 3 provides a
comparative statics analysis under these two taxes. Using CES utility and linear price
function, we study welfare comparison with numerical simulation as an example in
section 4. We show most of our complex calculations to derive our results in appen-
dices.
2.2 The Model
In this model, there is a single representative consumer with initial wealth I. He
consumes only one type of good and can choose both quantity and quality. Let y ∈ R++
be a quantity and θ ∈ R++ be a quality. The price for unit consumption is determined by
quality via a strictly increasing and differentiable function p(θ). The consumer derives
utility from quantity and quality, which is defined by v(y, θ). To guarantee an interior
22
solution with respect to each input, we assume that v is twice differentiable, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave in (y, θ).
The government can put tax on either the unit price p(θ) or the quantity y. If the
consumer adopts an ad-valorem tax ta, the budget constraint must be:
(1 + ta)p(θ)y ≤ I, (1)
while if the consumer chooses a specific tax ts, the budget constraint must become
(p(θ) + ts)y ≤ I. (2)
The taxpayers maximize their own utility with respect to quantity y and quality θ given
the budget constraint. From the first order conditions, we can derive the following















where vk denotes the derivative of v with respect to k = y, θ, the subscript a the choice
of an ad-valorem tax, and s is the choice of a specific tax. Given initial wealth I, tax
rate t, and tax scheme i = s, a, their quantity choice function, quality choice function,
and indirect utility function are defined as follows: y(ti, I), θ(ti, I), and V(ti, I).
When the government employs an ad-valorem tax, the budget constraint faced by
the consumer is:
ta p(θa)ya ≥ R (5)
where R is an exogenous amount of public expenditure. On the other hand, if the
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consumer imposes a specific tax, the budget constraint is:
tsys ≥ R (6)
2.3 Comparative Statics of (y, θ) on Tax Rate t Under
Ad-valorem Tax and Specific Tax
How do an ad-valorem tax and a specific tax affect the consumer’s demand for
quantity y and quality θ? In this chapter, we study the sensitivity of their choice (y, θ)
in response to each tax rate increase.
Let |K| and |M| be the determinants of a border Hessian matrix on the optimization
problem under ad-valorem tax and specific tax. By the comparative statics of y and θ






































demand elasticity of vθ. We would guarantee the second-order condition for this util-
ity maximization under ad-valorem tax. Thus, we impose the following assumptions:
ε
vθ
y ≥ 1 and p
′′(θ) ≥ 0 (see Appendix A).
From Equation (7) and Equation (8), both demands for quality θ and quantity y
decrease as ad-valorem tax increases; that is, ∂θ
∂ta
(ta, Ia) < 0 and
∂y
∂ta
(ta, Ia) < 0 if the
second-order condition is satisfied. The intuition is that as the ad-valorem tax increases,
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the consumer’s disposable income decreases by t
a
1+ta
percent. On the other hand, the
marginal rate of substitution between quantity and quality is the same as that with-
out imposing the tax. Hence, decreasing disposable income decreases the consumer’s
demands for both quantity and quality due to the income effect.






























where γs is the Lagrangian multiplier under specific tax. Similar to the ad-valorem tax
case, it is assumed that εvθy ≥ 1 and p
′′(θ) ≥ 0 so that the second-order condition holds
(see Appendix A).
From Equation (9) and Equation (10), while
∂y
∂ts
(ts, I s) is negative, the sign of
∂θ
∂ts
(ts, I s) is ambiguous. Put differently, employing a specific tax induces the consumer
to reduce his demand for quantity but perhaps to select better quality as opposed to that
of the ad-valorem tax case. This is because the income effect and the substitution effect
occur as shown in Equation (4). From Equation (9), whether the quality is improved
depends on ρ, which indicates the extent to which the consumer wants to maintain the
quantity. If ρ is larger (smaller) than 1, the bracket in Equation (9) may be negative
(positive), so ∂θ
∂ts
(ts, I s) is negative (positive).
The intuition is that when the elasticity of the consumer’s marginal utility on quan-
tity is greater than 1, the consumer is not willing to decrease quantity and debases the
quality to cover his expenditure. In contrast, if ρ is sufficiently small, the consumer
does not hesitate to decrease the quantity, whereas the consumer upgrades the quality
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to compensate for the utility loss caused by the decrease in quantity. Thus, whether the
income effect dominates the substitution effect depends on ρ.
We summarize the above arguments in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that each sufficient condition for the representative consumer’s
optimization problem is satisfied. Then,





(ta, Ia) are negative, that is,, both
demand for quality θ and quantity y decrease in response to the tax increase.
2. Under specific tax,
∂y
∂ts
(ts, I s) is negative, which means that the demand decreases
when the tax rate increases while the sign of ∂θ
∂ts
(ts, I s) is determined by ρ. Par-
ticularly, the consumer’s demand for quality decreases if ρ > 1.
Here, we present a special case in which the second-order condition is satisfied,
and the following example is also used in the next section. We assume that the price
function is linear p(θ) = aθ where a > 0 and individuals’ preference is the constant
elasticity of the substitution (CES) utility function expressed by v(y, θ) = (αy−σ +
βθ−σ)−
1
σ , where α > 0, β > 0, α + β = 1, and σ are measures of complementarity
assuming that σ ≥ 1. 1
1+σ
is the elasticity of substitution. It is obvious that p′′(θ) ≥ 0
is satisfied. Additionally, if σ ≥ 1, εvθy ≥ 1 under both ad-valorem tax and specific
tax. Therefore, the results of proposition 1 hold in the environment. Moreover, we
demonstrate that consumers retain quality or select lower quality under specific tax,
that is, ∂θ
∂ts
≤ 0. The proofs are given in Appendix B, and the results are summarized in
the next corollary.




σ , where α > 0, β > 0, α + β = 1, and faces a linear price function
p(θ) = aθ. Under both ad-valorem tax and specific tax, the consumer demands for both
quality and quantity decrease in response to the tax rate increase.
2.4 Welfare Comparison
This section examines whether the government should adopt an ad-valorem or a
specific tax under the same tax revenue. For the remainder of the manuscript, we use
the following environment that was used in the previous special case: the price function
is p(θ) = aθ where a > 0, and the individual’s preference is the CES utility function
given by v(y, θ) = (αy−σ + βθ−σ)−
1
σ where α > 0, β > 0, α + β = 1 and σ ≥ 1. As
mentioned in section 3, the assumptions on the price function and the utility function
ensure the second-order conditions for the maximization problem. Additionally, the
elasticity of substitution 1
1+σ
is between 0 and 1
2
. σ is a component of the elasticity of
substitution and can be interpreted as the degree of complementarity. In the setting, we
can state the following.
Proposition 2. Assume that the price function is linear and the individual’s preference
is the CES utility function, that is, p(θ) = aθ where a > 0 and v(y, θ) = (αy−σ+βθ−σ)−
1
σ
where α > 0, β > 0, α + β = 1, and σ ≥ 1. If the tax revenue remains the same under
ad-valorem and specific tax,
1. ad-valorem tax is superior to specific tax in terms of the consumer’s welfare
except for the elasticity of substitution 1
1+σ
= 0;
2. the difference in welfare, that is, v(ya, θa)− v(ys, θs) decreases as σ increases, or
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the elasticity of substitution decreases;
3. ad-valorem tax and specific tax are indifferent in terms of the welfare when σ =
∞, that is, the utility function is a Leontief preference v(y, θ) = min{y, θ}.
This is shown in Appendix C. The result is intuitive. As shown by Equation (3) and
Equation (4), the marginal rate of substitution between quantity and quality includes
the tax rate under specific tax; the corresponding marginal rate of substitution does not
include the tax rate under an ad-valorem tax. In other words, the income effect only
changes consumption choice under an ad-valorem tax (Figure 2.1), whereas the substi-
tution effect as well as the income effect distort consumption choice under specific tax
(Figure 2.2). This implies that if a substitution effect exists, specific taxation generates
welfare losses since it distorts the individual’s behavior relative to the case without any
tax policy. Therefore, an ad-valorem tax is superior to a specific tax. The findings that
an ad-valorem tax is superior to a specific tax does not depend on the specification of
the utility function and the price function and the assumption that the government can
impose either an ad-valorem or a specific tax. Indeed, we show the statement without
specifying these functions when the government can employ both an ad-valorem and a
specific tax simultaneously (see Appendix D).
Additionally, the increase in σ implies that the substitution effect becomes smaller.
In other words, welfare losses caused by specific tax diminishes. Consequently, the
welfare difference decreases and, particularly, when the utility function is Leontief
preference, it is possible for the policymaker to achieve the same utility level via a
specific tax as an ad-valorem tax. This is because there is no substitution effect un-





Figure 2.1: The effect of ad-valorem tax on a consumer’s choice.
quality
quantity
Income Effect +Substitution Effect
Figure 2.2: The effect of specific tax on a consumer’s choice.
toward changing the tax rate is affected only by the income effect regardless of an ad-
valorem tax and a specific tax. Our conclusion is illustrated in Figure 2.3 for R = 1,
I = 6, a = 1, α = β = 0.5 and σ ∈ [1,∞).
Although Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide an illustrative explanation, these budget
lines are not correct because the consumer’s budget set is partially determined by a
linear price function; therefore, each budget line should not be straight. However, it is
sufficient to explain the mechanism of our result if the curvature of the budget line is
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Figure 2.3: Simulations of v(ya, θa)−v(ys, θs) with respect to σ.
smaller than that of the consumer’s utility indifference curve, which is the condition to
maximize utilities.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper compares ad-valorem tax and specific tax from the perspective of a rep-
resentative consumer’s welfare when the consumer has both a quantity and a quality
choice. Contrary to most papers investigating such a comparison of social welfare
under imperfect competition, we allow for quality choice as well as a competitive envi-
ronment. Using a linear price function for quality and CES utility function, we identify
that the substitution effect distorts the consumer’s optimal choice under specific tax,
which leads to the consequence that ad-valorem tax dominates the consumer’s choice
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in the sense of the consumer’s utility. On the other hand, since the substitution effect
vanishes under Leontief preferences, the two forms of tax are equivalent. Our main
result is different from that of previous studies, which show that specific tax can be
superior to ad-valorem tax for social welfare under quality choice by production sec-
tor, as in Kay and Keen (1983, 1991) and Delipalla and Keen (2006). These papers
argue that the “multiplier effect” imposes excess burden on improving product quality.
Therefore, specific tax can be superior to ad-valorem tax under firms’ quality choices,
but the representative consumer in our model can choose quality, so ad-valorem tax is
like a lump-sum tax on initial wealth. Thus, only income effect distorts the consumer’s
decision. Roughly speaking, this explains why ad-valorem tax is superior to specific
tax in our model unless the elasticity of substitution equals 0.
Although our model is simple in the sense that consumers focus on one taxable
good, as the first step, we have priority over unveiling the interaction between prefer-
ence and two tax schemes. Additionally, the result can be applied to a case in which the
consumer faces liquidity constraints. For instance, in a housing choice, the consumer
selects the location and scale, and the government often collects taxes from such con-
sumption. Our result suggests that the government should levy taxes on the unit) land
price if consumers have substitution between location and scale. Consequently, this
study has implications for the understanding of the effect of two forms of commodity
tax on consumer’s quality choice.
The unsolved question in our paper is whether an ad-valorem tax is superior to a
specific tax for many taxable goods. In this situation, the government faces an addi-
tional problem, which is the choice between a uniform or differentiated commodity
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tax from the standpoint of efficiency. If the government employs a uniform tax on all
goods, we conjecture that our main conclusion holds because an ad-valorem tax still
acts as a lump-sum tax while a specific tax distorts the consumer’s choice between the
quality and quantity of taxable goods. However, if the government employs differenti-
ated indirect taxes, an ad-valorem tax distorts the consumer’s choice compared to the
model under one taxable good, which means that wholly ad-valorem tax may not be
optimal. Atkinson and Stiglitz. (1972) is an important study that solves the question
since the paper shows that a uniform tax is desirable under an exogenous income. If
the findings hold even under the situation in which consumers can choose quantity and
quality, wholly ad-valorem tax would be desirable even under many taxable goods if
income is given as it is in our setting. Moreover, to clarify whether the desirability of
an ad-valorem tax crucially depends on the assumption of an exogenous income, we
will extend the model by allowing consumers to choose the amount of labor supply.
This theme is left for future research.
Appendix A: Comparative statics under varying tax rates




s.t. (1 + ta)p(θ)y ≤ I.
The corresponding Lagrangian is:
L = v(y, θ) + γa[I − (1 + ta)p(θ)y]
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The first-order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂y
= vy − γ
a(1 + ta)p(θ) = 0
∂L
∂θ
= vθ − γ
a(1 + ta)p′(θ)y = 0
∂L
∂γa
= I − (1 + ta)p(θ)y = 0





a(1 + ta)p′(θ) + vyθ −(1 + t
a)p(θ)
−γa(1 + ta)p′(θ) + vyθ vθθ − γ
a(1 + ta)p′′(θ)y −(1 + ta)p′(θ)y
−(1 + ta)p(θ) −(1 + ta)p′(θ)y 0


























Here, we assume that εvθy ≥ 1 and p
′′(θ) ≥ 0 for utility maximization, that is, |K|
is positive. Therefore, it ensures the existence of the inverse matrix K−1 and then
























a p(θ) −(1 + ta)p(θ)
−γa(1 + ta)p′(θ) + vyθ γ
a p′(θ)y −(1 + ta)p′(θ)y























(1 − ρ − εvθy )























γa p(θ) −γa(1 + ta)p′(θ) + vyθ −(1 + t
a)p(θ)
γa p′(θ)y vθθ − γ
a(1 + ta)p′′(θ)y −(1 + ta)p′(θ)y







































s.t. (p(θ) + ts)y ≤ I.
The corresponding Lagrangian is:
L = v(y, θ) + γs[I − (p(θ) + ts)y]
The first-order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂y
= vy − γ
s(p(θ) + ts) = 0
∂L
∂θ
= vθ − γ
s p′(θ)y = 0
∂L
∂γ
= I − (p(θ) + ts)y = 0





s p′(θ) + vyθ −(p(θ) + t
s)
−γs p′(θ) + vyθ vθθ − γ
s p′′(θ)y −p′(θ)y
−(p(θ) + ts) −p′(θ)y 0























Again, we assume that εvθy ≥ 1 and p
′′(θ) ≥ 0 for utility maximization, that is, |M| is
























s −(p(θ) + ts)
−γs p′(θ) + vyθ 0 −p
′(θ)y
























(2 − ρ − εvθy )























γs −γs p′(θ) + vyθ −(p(θ) + t
s)







































Appendix B: A sufficient condition for the maximization
problem
Assume p(θ) = aθ and v(y, θ) = (αy−σ + βθ−σ)−
1
σ , where a > 0, α > 0, β > 0,
α + β = 1, and σ ≥ 1. In this case, εvθy is given by:
εvθy = α(σ + 1)(αy
−σ + βθ−σ)−1y−σ (B.1)
Before examining the second-order conditions under ad-valorem tax and specific tax,
we suggest the first-order conditions in the setting from Equation (3) and Equation (4):







Equation (B.2) is the first-order condition under ad-valorem tax and Equation (B.3) is
one under specific tax.
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We now turn to the analysis of the second-order conditions. First, we derive a





(σ + 1) (B.4)
Therefore, if σ ≥ 1, εvθy ≥ 1. On the other hand, substituting Equation (B.3) into
Equation (B.1), εvθy under specific tax can be rewritten as follows:




This means that if σ ≥ aθ
aθ+ts
, εvθy ≥ 1. Note that
aθ
aθ+ts
< 1 under R > 0.
To sum up, σ ≥ 1 is a sufficient condition to yield a locally maximum solution
under both ad-valorem and specific tax.
Next, we compute ρ under the setting. By the definition and Equation (B.1), it can
be rewritten as follows:
ρ = −(σ + 1)
[
α(αy−σ + βθ−σ)−1y−σ − 1
]
= 1 − εvθy + σ (B.6)








(1 − σ) (B.7)
As a result, the sign of ∂θ
∂ts
is determined by σ. If σ is lower than 1, it is positive
since the substitutability is high. However, σ is equal to or greater than 1 for utility
maximization, which means that the complementarity is high. Therefore, ∂θ
∂ts
is non-
positive under σ ≥ 1.
□
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Appendix C: The welfare comparison
Assume that the price function is linear and individual’s preference is the CES util-
ity function. First, we compute the optimal indirect utility function under ad-valorem




























Thus, we can derive the optimal indirect utility function, using Equation (B.2) and then
substituting Equation (C.3) into the CES utility function as follows:



















Here, we assume that I
R
> 1 to avoid his bankruptcy. Next, we compute the optimal

























































Thus, we can derive the optimal indirect utility function, substituting Equation (C.7)
and Equation (C.9) into the CES utility function as follows:


























Now, we compare the utility level under ad-valorem tax with one under specific tax.
Using Equation (C.4) and Equation (C.10), the difference is

































































































2σ . To show the fact, we

























Therefore, f ( I
R


















Therefore, v(ya, θa)−v(ys, θs) is positive except forσ = ∞. Moreover, v(ya, θa)−v(ys, θs)





2σ is decreasing in σ. With the bracket decreasing in σ, we can state that
v(ya, θa) − v(ys, θs) is decreasing in σ.
□
Appendix D: General case under both ad-valorem and
specific taxes




v = v(y, θ)
s.t. [(1 + ta)p(θ) + ts]y ≤ I.
The first-order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂y
= vy − γ[(1 + t
a)p(θ) + ts] = 0
∂L
∂θ




= I − [(1 + ta)p(θ) + ts]y = 0
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vyy −γ(1 + t
a)p′(θ) + vyθ −[(1 + t
a)p(θ) + ts]
−γ(1 + ta)p′(θ) + vyθ vθθ − γ(1 + t
a)p′′(θ)y −(1 + ta)p′(θ)y
−[(1 + ta)p(θ) + ts] −(1 + ta)p′(θ)y 0























Here, we assume that εvθy ≥ 1 and p
′′(θ) ≥ 0 to ensure the maximization problem.



















γ(1 + ta)(p′(θ)y)2[(1 + ta)p(θ) + ts] (D.2)
The objective of the government is to maximize the indirect utility V ≡ V(ts, ta) ≡
u(θ∗ ≡ θ(ts, ta), y∗ ≡ y(ts, ta)) subject to the government’s budget constraint ta p(θ∗)y∗ +





p(θ)y + ta p′(θ)
∂θ
∂ta












y + ta p′(θ)
∂θ
∂ts








Using the Roy’s identity, Equation (D.3) and Equation (D.4) can be rewritten as



























where α ≡ ∂V
∂I
. Combining Equation (D.5) and Equation (D.6), we can get
ta p(θ∗)





















(1 + ta)p(θ∗) + ts
(D.7)
The second equality is derived by substituting Equation (D.1) and Equation (D.2). Note







if ts is positive. Therefore, wholly ad-valorem taxation is optimal.
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Chapter 3
Public good provision financed
by nonlinear income tax under
reduction of envy
3.1 Introduction
In an economy where agents have different skill levels, there are several ethical rea-
sons to consider income redistribution. One such reason is the envy caused by income
inequality. One agent envies another agent if he/she prefers the other’s commodity
bundle to his/her own. Income inequalities or many complaints among citizens lead to
collective decision making out of the way. Recently, World Economic Forum (2017)
reported that the income gap, one of the sources of envy, is a major driving force of
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polarized political outcomes. Further, as Bös and Tillmann (1985) noted,
the economic rationale for a minimization or reduction of envy by taxa-
tion is the following. Excessive envy in a society is an element of social
disorder. Reducing envy in a society is a step towards increasing social
harmony. (p. 34)
Hence, reducing envy is not only a normative concept but also a relevant constraint for
the politicians concerned with the harmony of society.
In the context of income taxation with endogenous labor supply, high-skilled agents
cannot envy low-skilled ones because of the self-selection constraint. Conversely, low-
skilled agents must envy high-skilled ones. While it is difficult to apply the original
envy-free constraint presented by Varian (1974), we replace the weaker and cardinal
criterion proposed by Diamantaras and Thomson (1989) to evaluate the intensity of
envy, called λ envy-free, and examine the optimal policy schedule under not only self-
selection or incentive compatibility, which extracts the true information on skill from
each agent, but also constraints on the reduction of envy.
In this study, we investigate the optimal nonlinear income taxation with public good
provision constrained on the reduction of envy, as well as the conventional constraints
used by Boadway and Keen (1993). The objective of the government is to achieve
a Pareto-efficient allocation, so that it maximizes low-class utility given the require-
ments for high-class utility, budget constraint, self-selection, and reduction of envy. In
such situations, we derive the optimal provision rule of the public good, as well as the
marginal income tax rate for each class. For the marginal income tax rate, we obtain
the same results as Nishimura (2003b). Conversely, we derive the optimal provision
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rule following Boadway and Keen (1993), except for the distortion that arises from the
λ envy-free constraint. This ethical constraint for the low class allows the policymaker
to compare the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) for the high class with that for
the λ high class and use the difference to relax that constraint. In particular, because
changing the amount of private consumption for the high class implies changing that
for the λ high-class λ times as much as for the original high class, the direction of the
distortion is determined by whether the MRS is a step up or step down. To understand
the provision rule, we use the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function
on private consumption and the public good, and show that the elasticity of substitution
plays a key role in determining the sign. In addition, we conduct a numerical simula-
tion to reveal the effect of λ on the public good provision. As extensions, we study the
public good provision under mixed taxation, keeping the other settings constant.
The studies related to this research can be categorized into taxation with public
good provision and optimal taxation under reduction of envy. The latter category may
represent taxation in cases where a policymaker aims to satisfy fair distribution such as
the maximin or Pigou-Dalton principle.1 However, this study allows the policymaker
to set the reduction of envy as one of the constraints, not as an objective. With regard to
the optimal taxation for the reduction of envy, Nishimura (2003b) studies the optimal
nonlinear income taxation under constraints on the reduction of envy, showing that the
marginal income tax rate can increase only if leisure is a luxury. In addition, Nishimura
(2003a) examines the optimal commodity taxation for the reduction of envy. Both these
1For instance, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) derive the optimal income tax schedule in settings where
the social planner maximizes the social index satisfying several axioms for fairness and inequality aversion.
They characterize the social index as meeting several axioms before deriving the optimal policy.
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studies adopt a particular envy-free notion, namely the λ envy-free of Diamantaras and
Thomson (1989). While we adopt the same approach, our study introduces public good
provision by the government.
On the optimal nonlinear income taxation with public good provision, Boadway
and Keen (1993) show that a government provides a public good following the mod-
ified Samuelson rule, which embraces the self-selection term. This means that the
policymaker reduces the provision level when the mimicker values the public good
more than low-ability agents to redistribute more tax wealth. Nava et al. (1996) study
the optimal nonlinear income and linear commodity taxation with pure public good
provision, showing that the Samuelson rule is modified by two additional terms related
to the self-selection constraint and revenue of indirect taxes, as well as that these terms
disappear when the utility function is weakly separable between public and private
goods (taken together) and leisure. Gaube (2005b) provides a sufficient condition for
both a lower and higher level of public expenditure in the second best than in the first
best based on Boadway and Keen (1993).
In the optimal tax literature, several theoretical studies have explored the effect of
status or relative consumption (or income), that is, individuals’ utilities depend on not
only their own consumption of goods but also their relative standing in the society
(e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Seidman (1987), Persson (1995),
Ireland (2001), Corneo (2002), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), Balestrino
(2009), Micheletto (2011), Kanbur and Tuomala (2013), Bruce and Peng (2018)). In
particular, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) and Micheletto (2011) examine
the public good provision under the optimal nonlinear income tax in the presence of
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interdependence in individuals’ utilities. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) de-
scribe relative consumption as the difference between individual’s own consumption
and the average consumption in an economy, and show that the Samuelson rule should
be upwardly distorted when leisure is weakly separable from private and public con-
sumption. Additionally, Micheletto (2011) focuses only on the case where individu-
als care about the consumption of a richer group, according to evidence provided by
Bowles and Park (2005). As the consumption of higher-income agents increases, it neg-
atively affects the preferences of lower income agents, which is considered as ”Veblen
effect” in his paper. He also shows that the overprovision of the public good relative to
the Samuelson rule is always optimal due to the Veblen effect if no self-selection con-
straints are binding. While these studies investigate the second-best allocation when
agents have other-regarding preferences, we study the λ equitable allocation under the
second-best environment when agents do not have other-regarding preferences.2 We
show that the λ envy-free approach proposes not only the case where the overprovision
of the public good is optimal but also two novel cases where the underprovision of the
public good is optimal and the Samuelson rule applies even if self-selection constraints
are not binding, assuming a special form of the utility function.3
2To clarify how status effects should be reflected in the optimal provision rule of public goods expressed
by equation (5), we will characterize the second-best Samuelson rule under the reduction of envy when
agents have other-regarding preferences in future research. Velez (2016) and Nakada (2018) explore the
equitable allocation of multiple indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences.
However, they do not analyze the second-best provision rule for public goods under the setting.
3This paper also belongs to the strand of optimal tax literature on poverty alleviation or income inequality,
since we assume all individuals share the same utility function. While there are some papers on this topic
(e.g., Besley and Kanbur (1988), Besley and Coate (1992, 1995), Kanbur et al. (1994), Pirttilä and Tuomala
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the op-
timal provision rule for pure public goods under the reduction of envy and section 3
presents simple numerical examples. Section 4 extends the model to the case of linear
commodity taxation and section 5 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Optimal income taxation with public good provi-
sion for reduction of envy
We consider a two-class economy in which each agent (i = H, L) possesses an
exogenous skill level wi, where wH > wL > 0. There is a continuum of individuals
with unit mass. Let nH ∈ (0, 1) denote the proportion of high-skilled individuals and
the remaining nL = 1 − nH the proportion of low-skilled ones. They earn their income
by supplying labor, and their earnings are the product of the unit wage (or skill level)
and amount of labor supply. The government collects taxes on their incomes, which can
be scheduled nonlinearly. In addition, it provides a public good by using the collected
taxes.
First, we assume three types of goods: consumption (or after-tax income) c ∈ R+,
labor supply l, and public good G ∈ R+. We also assume that each worker provides
at most l̄ labor, meaning that he/she chooses supply level l to be between 0 and l̄.
Every agent shares an identical utility function, U(ci,G, li), and U is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing in c and G and strictly decreasing
(2004), Kanbur et al. (2018)), they are different from our analysis because they consider non-welfarist’s
optimization, whereas we attempt to find the constrained Pareto-efficient allocation.
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in l. Let Y be labor income. If agent i, with skill wi, earns labor income Yi, we can
replace the expression with U(ci,G,
Yi
wi
). To provide the public good, the government
must incur production cost ϕ(G) with a strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice
continuously differentiable function. For all goods except the public good, a good with
subscript i means one that agent i enjoys.
We assume that the government wants to achieve a constrained Pareto-efficient allo-
cation. Specifically, we consider the problem of maximizing low-skilled utility subject
to high-skilled agents having at least a given utility level, ū. The planner faces three
other constraints. First, the government faces a resource constraint. Let T : R → R be
the income tax function, and agent i’s budget constraint is written as ci = wili−T (wili).
Therefore, the government’s resource constraint is
nLT (wLlL) + nHT (wHlH) = nL(wLlL − cL) + nH(wHlH − cH) ≥ ϕ(G). (1)
Second, the policymaker cannot observe agents’ skill directly but does know their
earned income. Hence, we require that he/she resolves the information asymmetry
problem, called the self-selection constraint. We formulate this as follows:




for any i, j = H, L with i , j. Finally, we impose an ethical constraint for reducing
envy. The equity concept of no-envy faces a difficulty in the second-best situation, since
the low-skilled agent always envies the high-skilled one, whereas the high-skilled agent
never envies the low-skilled agent.4 As a less demanding criterion of envy reduction,




lL) > U(cL,G, lL). Therefore, the high-skilled agent never envies the low-skilled agent, which
means that the envy-free constraint for the low-skilled agent is not satisfied.
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we adopt the λ envy-free introduced by Diamantaras and Thomson (1989) and used
by Nishimura (2003a,b) as a cardinal measure of the intensity of envy. The reason
to employ cardinal concepts is that, according to Bös and Tillmann (1985), ordinal
concepts are not useful because there is an invariant hierarchy of envy in the second-
best analysis. Also, note that the Lagrangian expression of the optimization problem
with the λ envy-free constraint (equation (4)) is similar to the social objective of Varian
(1976a), who incorporates degrees of envy into the social objective, not constraint.
However, λ envy-free is better in the sense that it is independent of the comparability
and cardinality of utility functions (see Nishimura (2003b) for details).
Let λi j be a nonnegative real number, such that U(ci,G, li) = U(λi jc j,G, l̄−λi j(l̄−l j))
when U(ci,G, li) ≤ U(c j,G, l j) and λi j ≡ 1 when U(ci,G, li) > U(c j,G, l j). If λi j is
unity, it is the no-envy case. When agent i envies agent j, the value of λi j represents the
amount by which one would have to decrease j’s bundle to stop agent i envying agent j.
In other words, λi j indicates the intensity of envy. Assume that agent i compares his/her
own bundle with the bundle containing the public good and a proportional contraction
of agent j’s consumption and leisure between points (0, l̄) and (x j, l j). Let λ ≡ mini j λi j.
Under the binding self-selection constraint, λ = λLH , since λLH < 1 and λHL = 1. An
allocation is then λ envy-free if U(ci,G, li) ≥ U(λc j,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − l j)) for all i and j. We
consider that the government is constrained by a given λ envy-free requirement:
U(ci,G, li) ≥ U(λc j,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − l j)), (3)
for any i, j = H, L with i , j.5 Because a high-skilled agent never envies a low-skilled
5Nishimura (2000) presents the tax policy implications under the Pareto-efficient allocations that maxi-
mize λ as in Diamantaras and Thomson (1989). He also shows that envy is minimized at the leximin allo-
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agent, we focus only on the λ envy-free constraint for the low-skilled agent.






U(cH ,G, lH) ≥ ū
nL(wLlL − cL) + nH(wHlH − cH) ≥ ϕ(G)
U(ci,G, li) ≥ U(c j,G,
w j
wi
l j) where i, j = H, L with i , j
U(cL,G, lL) ≥ U(λcH ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH)).
The Lagrangian is
L(cL, cH , lL, lH ,G; γ, δr, δsH , δsL, δe) =
U(cL,G, lL) + γ{U(cH ,G, lH) − ū}
+δr{nL(wLlL − cL) + nH(wHlH − cH) − ϕ(G)}
+δsH{U(cH ,G, lH) − U(cL,G,
wL
wH




+δe{U(cL,G, lL) − U(λcH ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH))},
(4)
where γ, δr, δsH , δsL, and δe are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the first, sec-
ond, third, fourth, and fifth constraints, respectively.6 Note that this problem is almost
the same as that of Boadway and Keen (1993), but we incorporate the λ envy-free con-
cation that maximizes the utility of the low-skilled agent. By contrast, this study examines the second-best
Pareto-efficient allocations corresponding to various λ, as in Nishimura (2003a,b).
6Nishimura (2003b) demonstrates that the second-best frontier with the λ envy-free constraint gradually
shrinks as λ increases. Indeed, as long as δe is positive, L decreases λ.
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straint. Appendix A shows the first-order conditions with respect to the Lagrangian.
Hereafter, we focus on the redistributive cases only: δsL = 0 and δsH > 0.
3.2.1 Marginal income tax rate
We derive the marginal income tax rate for each type in the same way as Nishimura
(2003b). Let U ia ≡ ∂U(ci,G, li)/∂ai, Ûc ≡ ∂U(cL,G,
wL
wH







and Ūa ≡ ∂U(λcH ,G, l̄−λ(l̄−lH))/∂(λaH), where i = H, L and a = c, l. The next lemma
provides the marginal income tax rates.
Lemma 1. Under the redistributive cases when δsL = 0 and δsH > 0,





MRS L(y, c) − ˆMRS (y, c)
]
> 0,





























measured at (λcH ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH)).
This lemma is consistent with Nishimura (2003b).7 Because of the self-selection
constraint for agents with high skill, the marginal income tax rate for low-skilled agents
must be positive, as shown by Stiglitz (1982). Conversely, the marginal income tax
7Nishimura (2003b) also examines these marginal income tax rates when the self-selection constraint for
low-skilled workers is binding.
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rate on the top is different from the standard result presented by Stiglitz (1982), since
the term that represents the effect of the λ envy-free constraint appears.8 Nishimura
(2003b) shows that if the income elasticity of leisure is greater (less) than 1, MRS H
lc
is
greater (less) than ¯MRS lc, which means that the marginal income tax rate on the top
must be positive (negative).9 Of course, if MRS H
lc
= ¯MRS lc, it must be zero. Moreover,
if the equitability constraint does not bind (i.e., δe = 0), then it must be zero.
3.2.2 Provision rule of the public good
This section presents the public good provision rule at the optimum. As per Boad-
way and Keen (1993), the optimal provision rule includes the self-selection term, which
plays an important role in income redistribution. If the mimicker places more weight
on the public good based on private consumption than the mimicked one with low skill,
the government should reduce its production and transfer the tax revenue to low-class
agents. In addition, to relax the λ envy-free constraint, the government increases or
decreases the amount. For instance, if the evaluation of the public good for the private
good at the λ-scaled bundle (λcH ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH)) is higher than that the high-skilled
agent receives, then he/she must reduce the provision level to redistribute more income.
Let U i
G
≡ ∂U(ci,G, li)/∂G, ÛG ≡ ∂U(cL,G,
wL
wH
lL)/∂G, and ŪG ≡ ∂U(λcH ,G, l̄ −
λ(l̄− lH))/∂G, where i = H, L. Formally, we can derive the optimal rule with respect to
8Note that the difference in the MRS between consumption and labor, not the efficiency-unit labor, be-
tween the envying and envied agent is useful information for the government, since the λ envy-free constraint
allows us to consider a proportional decrease of the envied agent’s bundle.
9According to the definition of Nishimura (2003b), if the income elasticity of leisure is greater (less) than
1, leisure is called a luxury (necessity).
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the public good provision in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the optimal nonlinear income taxation with the λ envy-free and































icker’s MRS between c and G, and ¯MRS Gc ≡
ŪG
Ūc
is the MRS measured at (λcH ,G, l̄ −
λ(l̄ − lH)).
The first term is the sum of agent i’s MRS for public good G measured by private
consumption ci and the second term the effect of the incentive constraint. The third
term is a novel one, which reflects the effect on the λ envy-free constraint and whose
implication is similar to that of the incentive constraint. Because λ distorts the con-
sumption/leisure bundle for the envying agent, this term may not be zero. To relax the
λ envy-free constraint, the government changes the provision level of the public good
and makes room to improve welfare. We suggest an intuitive interpretation of the third
term. Starting from the original Samuelson rule, consider the following redistribution.
The government imposes an additional tax liability MRS i
Gc
on type-i individuals to in-
crease G. The tax reform does not change the welfare of type-i individuals or the gov-







¯MRS Gc, the third term in equation (5) suggests that the original Samuelson
rule should be upwardly shifted. This implies that an increase in G mitigates the inten-
sity of envy for low-type agents because the tax liability of the envied agent is larger
than that of the envying agent and, then, the difference between their utilities is re-
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duced. Therefore, the upward distortion relaxes the λ envy-free constraint for low-type
individuals.
Boadway and Keen (1993) show that the original Samuelson rule for the public
good provision is replicated when each agent’s preference is represented by U(H(c,G), l),
namely c and G are weakly separable with l in the utility function. In this case, while
the second bracket on the left-hand side is zero, it is ambiguous whether the third
bracket is zero.
3.2.3 A special case: CES utility function
This subsection derives the direction of the distortion due to the binding λ envy-
free constraint on the provision rule by using a concrete utility function. To exam-
ine the direction of the distortion, we assume that the utility function is expressed by
U(H(c,G), l) and H(c,G) is the CES functional form: H(c,G) = (αcρ + βGρ)
1
ρ , where
ρ ≤ 1. If ρ converges to zero, H(c,G) converges to the Cobb–Douglas expression (i.e.,














1 − λ−ρ determines the sign and the elasticity of substitution 1
1−ρ
plays a crucial role
since λ < 1. If 1
1−ρ
∈ (0, 1), then the direction of the distortion is positive; otherwise,
that direction is negative except for 1
1−ρ
= 1. If 1
1−ρ
= 1, the bracket equals zero and,
thus, the third and second terms disappear. To sum up, the next corollary describes the
direction of the distortion on the provision rule.




ρ . The optimal provision rule distorts
• Downwardly if the elasticity of substitution 1
1−ρ
∈ (1,+∞) or ρ = 1;
• Upwardly if the elasticity of substitution 1
1−ρ
∈ (0, 1).
In addition, the rule coincides with the Samuelson rule if the elasticity of substitution
equals one.
If the elasticity of substitution is above one, the government increases private con-
sumption for the high type by decreasing the provision level of the public good. The
elasticity of substitution means the variation of the ratio between private consumption
and the public good ( ci
G
) when MRS i
Gc
changes. Hence, when the elasticity of substitu-
tion is above one, an decrease of the ratio due to a proportional contraction of private
consumption for high type allows the MRS between private consumption and public
good to decrease by less than the proportional decrease in the corresponding MRS. This
means that ¯MRS Gc > λMRS
H
Gc
, which is equivalently to stating that the corresponding
MRS for envying agents (i.e., 1
λ
¯MRS Gc) is greater than the corresponding MRS for
envied agent (i.e., MRS H
Gc
). That is, envying agents value the public good more than
envied agent. Thus, it is desirable for the government that the amount of the public
good decreases and private consumption for high type increases. Also, the argument is
symmetric for the opposite case where the elasticity of substitution is below one.
The validity of the Samuelson rule under ρ = 0 stems from that H(·) is homothetic
in c. In this case, a proportional decrease of the envied agent’s consumption implies






10Consider that H(·) is homogeneous of degree k in c. The third term can be rewritten as follows:
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3.2.4 Remarks: λ envy-free constraint
We make two comments about key constraint (3) in our model, the λ envy-free
constraint: (i) the form of the λ envy-free constraint; (ii) the interaction between the
self-selection constraint for the high-type and the λ envy-free constraint for the low-
type.
First, we explain why the intensity of envy λ is not applied to the amount of the
public good in the λ envy-free constraint. In our model, we consider that agent i com-
pares two bundles: his/her own bundle, (xi,G, li), and the bundle containing the public
good and a proportion λ of agent j’s consumption and leisure, (λc j,G, l̄−λ(l̄− l j)). Re-
member that the classic concept of no-envy is not useful here due to the self-selection
constraint. If no agent envies any other agent’s bundle including the public good and
the proportional contraction of the consumption and leisure, the allocation satisfies the
λ envy-free constraint. This means that the utility of one agent does not increase, even
if the government allocates the bundle of any other agent consisting of the public good
and λ-scaled consumption and leisure to the agent. From this viewpoint, if one shrinks
the amount of the public good in the λ envy-free constraint, the government needs to
be able to implement the λ proportion of the public good to prevent one agent from
envying any other agent. However, since all individuals share the same amount of the
public good (i.e., public goods are non-rivalrous) provided by the government in this
economy, such an allocation is infeasible. Therefore, it is inconsistent to impose the
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the λ envy-free constraint given by equation (3).
If we were to rewrite the constraint as:
U(ci,G, li) ≥ U(λc j, λG, l̄ − λ(l̄ − l j)),

















˜MRS Gc) = ϕ
′(G),
where ˜MRS Gc ≡
ŨG
Ũc
, ŨG ≡ ∂U(λcH , λG, l̄−λ(l̄−lH))/∂(λG), and Ũc ≡ ∂U(λcH , λG, l̄−
λ(l̄ − lH))/∂(λcH). If we assume that the utility function is described by U(H(c,G), l),
the second term disappears. Also, if the function H(·) is homothetic, the marginal rate
of substitution between G and c is constant on the path of the λ-contraction of the
envied agent’s allocation, that is, MRS H
Gc
= ˜MRS Gc. Therefore, a sufficient condition
for the original Samuelson rule is that H(·) is homothetic. For example, if H(·) is the
CES functional form used in subsection 2.3, the original Samuelson rule is desirable.
Second, we clarify the interaction between self-selection constraints and λ envy-
free constraints. Here, we focus on the case where the government faces the second-
best environment, that is, the self-selection constraint for the high type must be binding.
Choosing any plausible utility function and profile of wages, let us consider a set Ω
consisting of all allocations satisfying the three constraints (the constraint that high-
type agents have at least a given level of utility, resource constraint, and self-selection
constraint for the high type) are binding and the λ envy-free constraint for the low-type








)} ∈ Ω. However,
any allocation ω is not implementable at the optimum as λ increases. Specifically, any
allocation ω violates the λ envy-free constraint for the low-type for any λ > λ̄, where
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λ̄ ≡ supω∈Ω λ















,Gω, l̄− λ(l̄− lω
H
))
holds for any ω from the fact that U(λcω
H
,Gω, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lω
H
)) is an increasing function
in λ. Additionally, λω is well defined from the intermediate value theorem because,
since U(λcω
H
,Gω, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lω
H
)) is continuously increasing in λ, the utility of low-type
agents is lower than for the high-type ones because of the self-selection constraint for
the high-type, and is greater than U(0,G, l̄) due to the interior solutions of cL and lL.
Here, assuming that λ̄ is below one, we address that if there exists at least one feasible
allocation in the optimization problem at λ ∈ (λ̄, 1), the allocation allows not only
the above three constraints but also the λ envy-free constraint for the low-type to be
binding. In other words, the following three cases do not appear at the optimum in
the interval (λ̄, 1): (i) the self-selection constraint for the high-type is binding and the
λ envy-free constraint for the low-type is slack; (ii) both the self-selection constraint
for the high-type and the λ envy-free constraint for the low-type are slack; and (iii) the
self-selection constraint for the high-type is slack and the λ envy-free constraint for
the low-type is binding. Obviously, the first case does not occur due to the definition
of λ̄. Next, if the second case is realized, the government can implement the first-
best allocation. Therefore, it contradicts the fact that we focus on the case where the
government cannot implement the first-best Pareto efficient allocation. Finally, we
















)} an allocation in the third case, and
assume it is the optimal allocation at λ ∈ (λ̄, 1). For any λ ≤ λ̄, note that the self-
selection constraint for the high-type is not affected and the λ envy-free constraint
for the low-type is slackened. That is, allocation ω0 is implementable as the first-
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best Pareto efficient allocation for any λ ≤ λ̄. Thus, it contradicts that the first-best
Pareto efficient allocation is not implementable. As such, although an allocation ω
is implementable at the optimum under any λ ≤ λ̄, the government needs to seek
allocations that both the self-selection constraint for the high-type and the λ envy-free
constraint for the low-type are binding over the interval (λ̄, 1), which means that the
optimal level of the public good is derived from equation (5).11
So far, we have assumed that the self-selection constraint is always binding. How-
ever, if the government can implement the first-best Pareto efficient allocation, we can-
not ignore the case where the λ envy-free constraint for the low-type is only binding. In
other words, it is not necessarily that the binding self-selection constraint for the high-
type is a necessary condition for the binding λ envy-free constraint for the low-type.
If the self-selection constraint for the high-type is slack and the λ envy-free constraint
for the low-type is binding, the original Samuelson rule should be modified only due
to the effect of the third term on the left-hand side of equation (5).
11Although we consider the Pareto frontier when the government is constrained by a given λ equitability
requirement as with Nishimura (2003a,b), there are the following unsolved questions left for future research.
First, while λω is below one due to the self-selection constraint for the high-type (see footnote 4), we cannot
conclude that λ̄ is below one from the definition of λ̄. Second, even though λ̄ is below one, it is unclear
whether there exists at least one feasible allocation in the optimization problem at λ ∈ (λ̄, 1). In the present
paper, instead of clarifying these questions analytically, we numerically provide some examples that the
government can implement allocations so that both constraints are binding (see Tables 1 and 2).
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3.3 Numerical examples
The previous section did not refer to the extent to which the λ envy-free requirement
affects the amount of the public good. Therefore, this section presents a quantitative
analysis of the amount of the public good. First, we examine the impact of the λ envy-
free requirement on the utility level of a low-skilled agent and the amount of the public
good. Next, we present the sensitivity of the amount of the public good with respect to
the changes in the parameter value expressing the intensity of envy, namely λ.
In the simulation, we make the following assumptions. First, not only for the sake
of simplicity but also to focus on the effect of the λ envy-free requirement on the
provision level of public good, we assume that the functional form of the utility is
U(c,G, l) = H(c,G)− v(l), where the sub-utility function H(·) takes the CES form with




1/e) with e > 0. According to the empirical estimates (e.g., Chetty et al. (2011)), we
set e = 2. Second, Fang (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2007) estimate that the college
wage premium is approximately 60%. We normalize low-type individuals’ parameter
wL to equal one and, thus, that of the high-type individuals is assumed to be wH = 1.6.
Third, according to an OECD (2010) report, approximately one-quarter of all adults
have attained tertiary education. Therefore, we assume that 25% of individuals are
high-skilled workers. In other words, we set nH = 0.25 and nL = 0.75. Finally, we
assume that ū is unity and the cost function takes the following form, being strictly
increasing and strictly convex: ϕ(·) = G2.
We suggest numerical examples for two cases: ρ = 1 and ρ = −1. Table 1 presents
the case in which the original Samuelson rule is downwardly distorted. First, the utility
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level of the low-skilled agent decreases as λ increases, since the second-best frontier
decreases. Second, the provision level decreases when the λ envy-free constraint is
binding, which supports the results of Corollary 1. Third, the provision level decreases
as λ increases. The intuition is that the government reinforces the income redistribution
by distorting the provision level to alleviate the intensified envy. Table 2 describes the
case in which the original Samuelson rule is upwardly distorted. As with the results in
Table 1, low-skilled utility decreases as λ increases. However, in contrast to the results
in Table 1, the provision level increases under the reduction of envy and increases
much more as λ increases. That is, the government mitigates the intensified envy by
the public good provision rather than income redistribution.
3.4 Mixed taxation
Here, we examine the optimal provision rule for public goods when the govern-
ment employs not only labor income but also commodity taxes. We assume that the
government can only levy linear commodity taxes, since it cannot observe individuals’
consumption levels.
Again, we define the identical utility function of agent i as U(ci, xi,G, li), where ci is
a numéraire commodity and xi another commodity. The producer price of commodity
x is constant and normalized to unity for simplicity. While the government cannot
impose any taxes on the numéraire good, it imposes proportional commodity tax t on
xi. For simplicity, we assume that nH = nL = 1, which does not affect the tax schedule
crucially. The other notations are the same as in the previous section.
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Following Mirrlees (1976) and Jacobs and Boadway (2014), we decompose indi-
vidual optimization into two stages. In the first stage, each agent chooses the amount
of labor supply given nonlinear income taxes, which allows us to determine disposable
income Ri ≡ wili −T (wili). In the second stage, each agent expenses his/her disposable
income to consume a numéraire and another commodity. We assume that individuals
anticipate the outcome for the second stage in the first stage. Now, we formally analyze
individuals’ problem. In the second stage, given {p,Ri,G, li}, agent i chooses ci and xi
to maximize utility U(ci, xi,G, li) subject to budget constraint ci + pxi = Ri, where
p ≡ 1 + t is the consumer price with respect to another commodity. The first-order




The maximization problem in the second stage yields conditional commodity demands





≡ x(p,Ri,G, li), respectively. As a result, substituting these solutions into












, and V i
l
be the partial derivatives of Vi with respect to p,
Ri, G, and l, respectively. From Roy’s identity and the Slutsky decomposition, we can



























































where c̃i and x̃i indicate the compensated conditional demands of individual i for the
numéraire and the taxable good, respectively.
In the first stage, each agent chooses the amount of labor supply to maximize con-














= 1 − T ′(wili). (12)
As above, the government faces the budget constraint, self-selection constraint to
prevent high-skilled workers from mimicking low-skilled ones, and λ-equitability con-
straint for reducing envy. We respectively formulate these as follows:
∑
i=H,L
[wili − Ri + (p − 1)x
∗
i ] ≥ ϕ(G), (13)
V(p,RH ,G, lH) ≥ V(p,RL,G,
wL
wH
lL) ≡ V̂ , (14)




H ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH)) ≡ V̄ . (15)






V(p,RH ,G, lH) ≥ ū
∑
i=H,L
[wili − Ri + (p − 1)x
∗
i ] ≥ ϕ(G)








H ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH)).
The Lagrangian is




[wili − Ri + (p − 1)x
∗
i ] − ϕ(G)}








H ,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH))},
(16)
where µ, γ, δ and η are the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the constraints, re-
spectively. Appendix B shows the first-order conditions with respect to the Lagrangian.
Before analyzing the provision rule for public goods, it is useful to explore the
optimal linear commodity tax rate. Let V̂p, V̂R, and V̂G be the partial derivatives of
V̂ with respect to p, R, and G. The linear commodity tax rate is characterized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that the allocations are restricted by reduction of envy. The
optimal commodity tax rate under the nonlinear labor income tax and public good
























where x̂ ≡ x(p,RL,G,
wL
wH
lL) is the mimicker’s demand for another commodity and Ūr




,G, l̄ − λ(l̄ − lH)).
The first term on the right-hand side is the self-selection effect; if the agent’s utility
is separable between the commodity part and labor supply term, then it must disappear.
We see this effect frequently in existing studies on mixed taxation. However, the second
term on the right-hand side is the original part for reducing envy, as seen in Nishimura
(2003a,b). Each term between the brackets is the inner product of the marginal utility of
the low-skilled agent and substitution effect of the compensated demand, which reflects
the reduction of envy by discouraging consumption by the high-skilled agent because



























¯MRS cx − MRS cx
]
. (18)
If the envying agent prefers the taxable good to the numéraire more than the envied
agent, namely ¯MRS cx > MRS cx, it is taxed more heavily. This term remains even if
the utility function is weakly separable between the public and private goods (taken
together) and leisure, namely U(H(ci, xi,G), li), while the first term on the right-hand
side of equation (17) disappears. To replicate the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem
(hereafter, A-S theorem), we assume the following functional form: H( f (ci, xi),G),
where f (·) is homothetic. In this case, the second term on the right-hand side of equa-
tion (18) disappears, which means that commodity taxation is superfluous. The suf-
ficient condition to hold the A-S theorem is slightly different from that in Nishimura
(2003a,b), since we impose an additional restriction, namely weak separability between
all private consumption and the public good.








We now characterize the optimal provision rule for the public good. The optimal
rule with respect to public good provision can be derived as in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Under linear commodity tax in addition to nonlinear income tax, the










































,G, l̄− λ(l̄− lH)) with respect to k = G,R.
On the left-hand side, the first term amounts to the sum of the evaluation for public
good G based on marginal utility for disposable income R and the second term is the
self-selection effect. The remaining part corresponds to the λ-equitability effect, which
is different from that of Nava et al. (1996). This part consists of two effects. The
first is the indirect effect, which is the inner product of the marginal utility of the low-
skilled agent and the substitution effect of the compensated demand; this reflects the
reduction of envy by discouraging consumption by the high-skilled agent because of
the provision of the public good. The second is the direct effect, which reduces envy
by decreasing the amount of the public good. On the right-hand side, the first term is
the marginal cost of the public good and the second term is analogous to Nava et al.
(1996), which means that the impact on indirect tax revenue increases the provision
level through the compensated effects on consumption for the change in the level.
When can we apply the original Samuelson rule in this case? The third term on the
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Following the analysis above, if the agent’s utility is expressed by U(H(ci, xi,G), li),
then the second term on the left-hand side of equation (19), which is the self-selection
term, disappears. In addition, if function H meets the following functional form:
H( f (ci, xi),G), where f (·) is homothetic, the second term on the right-hand side of
equation (20) must disappear, since MRS cx = ¯MRS cx holds. At the same time, the
second term on the right-hand side of equation (19) also disappears since t is zero, as
shown above. Therefore, as in the analysis without linear commodity tax, whether to
deviate from the original Samuelson rule depends on the first term on the right-hand
side of equation (20).
As in subsection 2.3, we investigate the direction of the distortions when the utility
function takes the CES form and has weak separability between labor and the other
variables. Let the utility function be H = (α f (·)ρ + βGρ)
1
ρ , where ρ ≤ 1 and f (·) is





¯MRS Gc = (1 − λ
−ρ)
βGρ−1
α f (·)ρ−1 fc(·)
.
Therefore, whether the original Samuelson condition is valid depends crucially on the
elasticity of substitution. As with the result of Corollary 1, if the elasticity of sub-
stitution is above (below) one, the optimal provision rule is downwardly (upwardly)
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distorted, although the original Samuelson condition holds when the elasticity of sub-
stitution equals one.13
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze the optimal policy for income taxation with public good
provision by a government concerned with the ethical constraint, namely the reduction
of envy. As the new constraint, we use the λ-equitability by Diamantaras and Thomson
(1989). To provide the public good, we then derive the optimal provision rule, as well
as the marginal income tax rate in the optimal policy. Although the income tax part
is the same as the results of Nishimura (2003a,b), the modified provision rule includes
the effect of reducing envy, which is different from the modified Samuelson rule in
Boadway and Keen (1993). To relax the ethical constraint, we adjust the amount of
the provided public good to compare the evaluation of low-skilled agents with that at
the referred commodity bundle. For instance, if an agent with the envied bundle places
more weight on the public good than the low-skilled agent, he/she must decrease the
provision level to use more tax income for redistribution. Furthermore, by using CES
utility for the public good and private consumption, we show that if the elasticity of
substitution is above (below) one, the original Samuelson condition is downwardly
13In general, if H is homogeneous of degree j in f on H = H( f (ci, xi),G) and f (·) is homoth-
etic under weak separability between labor and the other variables, the original Samuelson rule holds.





HG ( f (cH ,xH ),G)
Hc( f (cH ,xH ),G) fc(cH ,xH )
−
HG ( f (λcH ,λxH ),G)







HG ( f (cH ,xH ),G)
Hc( f (cH ,xH ),G) fc(cH ,xH )
−
λk jHG ( f (cH ,xH ),G)
λ×λk j−1Hc( f (cH ,xH ),G) fc(cH ,xH )
)
= 0. Therefore,
the λ-equitability term disappears and the original Samuelson rule is replicated.
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(upwardly) distorted. However, the original rule is valid if the elasticity of substitution
is one. As an extension, we add a taxable consumption good and linear commodity tax,
and study both the optimal tax rate and the provision rule of the public good.
There are two policy implications from our model. First, when paying attention to
the reduction of envy, the government must deal with the envied λ-scale bundle rela-
tive to the original bundle. Consequently, the government decreases the public good
provision when the elasticity of substitution between private consumption and the pub-
lic good is below one. In other words, a change in the ratio of their marginal utility
is sensitive to variations in the ratio of these volumes. The second implication is that
the public good provision increases much more or decreases much less as the intensity
of envy increases. Since increasing the degree tightens the envy-free constraint, poli-
cymakers cannot use the other redistribution scheme; instead, they must reinforce the
distorted direction of public good provision.
In Scandinavian countries, citizens place more weight on egalitarianism. Hence,
governments or tax authorities should pay attention to the overall coverage of social
security to reduce inequalities. They rely on the services provided by national systems,
and the shares of social security are always relatively high in their budgets. According
to OECD (2015), the 2015 Gini indexes of these countries (e.g., Sweden, Norway, Fin-
land, and Denmark) where people place more weight on egalitarianism such as social
justice were lower than the OECD average, while the government spending in 2015
on social protection in these countries was higher than the OECD average (see OECD
(2017)). On the other hand, residents in the United States believe that most services
must be accessible on the market and, thus, that the government’s budget should de-
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crease; they do not think it is necessary to make access to social security universal. In
reality, President Trump has cut the budgets for social security and Medicare despite
such fiscal policies breaking the major promises to his target voters (i.e., the poor).
Several tasks are left to future research. First, because we derive only the modified
Samuelson rule, there is room to derive the provision level in general cases, divided
into types of taxpayers’ utility functions. Second, future studies could investigate the
upper bound of intensity λ for the binding envy-free constraint. Intuitively, there are
three regions for the degree of envy λ: nonbinding constraint, binding constraint, and
violating constraint regions. Finally, related to the exogenous index λ, it would be
interesting to conduct comparative statics of public good provision for λ analytically.
Appendix A
Assume that δsH > 0 and δsL = 0. Differentiating Lagrangian (4) with respect to
cL, cH , lL, lH and G,
∂L
∂cH
= (γ + δsH)U
H
c − δrnH − δeλŪc = 0, (A.1)
∂L
∂cL
= (1 + δe)U
L
c − δrnL − δsHÛc = 0, (A.2)
∂L
∂lH
= (γ + δsH)U
H
l + δrnHwH − δeλŪl = 0, (A.3)
∂L
∂lL
= (1 + δe)U
L
l + δrnLwL − δsH
wL
wH
Ûl = 0, (A.4)
∂L
∂G
= (γ + δsH)U
H
G + (1 + δe)U
L
G − δrϕ
′(G) − δeŪG − δsHÛG = 0. (A.5)
Rearranging (A.1) and (A.3) yields the optimal marginal income tax rate at the top.
Conversely, we can derive the marginal income tax rate on the bottom by combining
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equations (A.2) and (A.4). The provision rule for the public good is obtained by sub-
stituting equations (A.1) and (A.2) into (A.5). □
Appendix B
Differentiating Lagrangian (20) with respect to p,RL,RH , and G,
∂L
∂p
= (1 + η)VLp + (µ + δ)V
H
p − δV̂p − ηV̄p + γ
∑
i=H,L




] = 0, (B.1)
∂L
∂RH














= (1 + η)VLG + (µ + δ)V
H







− γϕ′(G) = 0. (B.4)








x∗i = 0. (B.5)
By using equations (7), (8), (10), and x̂ = −
V̂p
V̂R
, equation (B.5) can be transformed into
equation (17). In addition, by substituting equations (B.2) and (B.3) into (B.4) and
using equations (9) and (11), we can derive equation (19).
□
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Table 3.1: Numerical examples under ρ = 1
Low-skill utility G
Case I
Second best without the λ envy-free constraint 0.228045 0.499994
Case II
Second best with the λ envy-free constraint (λ=0.89) 0.225014 0.497525
Case III
Second best with the λ envy-free constraint (λ=0.91) 0.182929 0.489892
Case IV
Second best with the λ envy-free constraint (λ=0.92) 0.0894965 0.450079
Table 3.2: Numerical examples under ρ = −1
Low-skill utility G
Case I
Second best without the λ envy-free constraint -0.406546 0.781823
Case II
Second best with the λ envy-free constraint (λ=0.785) -0.406572 0.78252
Case III
Second best with the λ envy-free constraint (λ=0.79) -0.428375 0.802776
Case IV
Second best with the λ envy-free constraint (λ=0.792) -0.481632 0.8229
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Chapter 4
Envy-free pricing for excludable
public good
4.1 Introduction
All over the world, income inequality becomes the biggest problem which leads to
chaotic society unless reducing it, and the solution is redistributive policy by a govern-
ment. There are several ways to redistribute collected incomes from rich ones to poor
ones. For instance, the government levies taxes on workers’ incomes, and transfers
the wealth from rich to poor. Another is to provide public services which are useful
for everyone but to which those with low income would have more limited access if
the government did not provide them. With reducing complaints between members in
society, the policymaker sets the optimal policy for income redistribution and imple-
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menting such public projects.
Why should policymakers take reduction of envy into consideration? There are
two different reasons: widespread social justice like in Scandinavian countries and an
element of social disorder which they should remove. For the first reason, all of Scan-
dinavian countries like Sweden are welfare states, their social justice is egalitarianism.
Recently, these social systems were partially reformed, but such societal norms remain
ingrained in these countries. For the latter, as Bös and Tillmann (1985) noted:
the economic rationale for a minimization or reduction of envy by taxa-
tion is the following. Excessive envy in a society is an element of social
disorder. Reducing envy in a society is a step towards increasing social
harmony. (p. 34)
However, this is not only the normative concept, but also an important issue which the
whole world confronts. As seen in reality, Brexit or other electoral consequences like
Donald Trump elected as the president of the United States reveal anti-globalism, and
some of specialists claim that one of the reasons is to remove envy of the poor to the
rich ones.1
In an economy where agents have different initial wealth, there are several ethical
reasons to consider redistribution, and these are the background for mitigating inequal-
ity. One of them is envy. An agent envies the other agent if he prefers the other’s
commodity bundle to his own. We call envy-free allocation where there is no envy for
every agent. It is difficult to apply the original envy-free constraint, but we replace the
1For example, according to World Economic Forum (2017), income gap is one of major sources bringing
about polarized political outcomes.
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weaker and cardinal criterion proposed by Diamantaras and Thomson (1989), called
λ-equitability, and examine the optimal policy schedule under reduction of envy con-
straint.
In this paper, we analyze public good provision by public sector with surcharge
fee and lump-sum transfer. Our analysis starts from Hellwig (2005b). In providing
public good without exclusion and rivality, the government sets the optimal policy
constraint on λ envy free as well as tax revenue. Before that, we check the differential
transfer system depending on their income reported by themselves. However, we find
that the only scheme for income transfer is uniform one constrained on information
revelation. Under these cases, we examine the optimal provision rule of public goods
with use exclusion and surcharge under the reduction of envy, assuming that individuals
have additive and separable preferences and differ in both preferences for public goods
and initial wealth or income. The consideration of λ envy free affects not only the
amount of public goods but also the level of user fees. Additionally, we numerically
simulate our model under Rawlsian government with the envy-free constraints and
several intensities of envy, which support our analytical results and obtain new findings
about comparative statics of the level of public provision about the index.
Related Literatures
We list papers related to this project categorized into optimal policy under reduction
of envy and public good provision with use exclusion. With regard to optimal policy for
reduction of envy, Nishimura (2003b) studies optimal nonlinear income taxation under
constraints about reduction of envy, which shows that the marginal tax rate increases
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only if leisure is luxury. Also, Nishimura (2003a) examines optimal commodity taxa-
tion for reduction of envy. Both papers adopt particular envy-free notion suggested by
Diamantaras and Thomson (1989), and we follow this manner, but our paper focus on
public good provision and user fee by the government, and do not include endogenous
labor supply but exogenous different incomes. Tsugawa and Obara (2017) incorporates
endogenous labor supply like his two works, and we take pure public good provision
by the policymaker into consideration as our novelty. In that paper, we show that such
envy free constraint distorts the provision level, and find that the intensity of envy
affects the amount of provision by numerical simulation. Lloret-Batlle and Jayakrish-
nan (2016) and Lloret-Batlle and Jayakrishnan (2017) study optimal pricing scheme of
traffic system which addresses fairness by employing envy-free constraint.
As to public good provision with use exclusion, Hellwig (2005b) allows a policy-
maker to exclude agents who value a public good less than the surcharge set by her,
which shows that a utilitarian government sets zero surcharge at optimum since rev-
enues from increasing the surcharge is dominated by social welfare for reducing the
fee, and that the revenue effect becomes stronger as the government is more risk-averse
since it is better to utilize more surcharge fees for redistribution. Norman (2004) also
examines excludable public good provision as mechanism design problems, but the
difference from Hellwig (2005b) is that the government assigns the access right to each
agent based on his reported preference while this paper allows her to set only the addi-
tional fee and the taxpayers to decide whether to make use of her services.2
2As well as those papers, for instance, Hellwig (2010) and Fang and Norman (2010) study excludable
public good provision under asymmetric information as mechanism design problem.
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This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the optimal
provision rule for pure public goods and the optimal pricing rule for user fees under
the reduction of envy, and the next section provides the numerical simulation. Section
4 offers concluding remarks.
4.2 The model
We consider an two-class economy in which each agent (i = H, L) possesses initial
wealth Yi, where YH > YL > 0. Without loss of generality, the population of each
agent is equal to one, and for each group, they have tastes for public good θ which is
distributed over [θ, θ] with cumulative distributive function F where 0 = θ < θ < ∞.
The incomes are private information for agents, and the government collects taxes on
their income nonlinearly. In addition, she provides public good by collected taxes and
surcharges their usage in order to compensate the public expenditure, so agents who
face the admission fee can decide whether to make access to the public good. At first,
we assume three kinds of goods, consumption (or after-tax income) c ∈ R+, labor
supply l and public good G ∈ R+. Every agent shares the identical utility function
U(ci,G), and we restrict attention to that U(ci,G) = θG + ci.




In providing public good, the government must incur its production cost ϕ(G) with an
increasing, strictly convex, and differentiable function. For all goods except for public
good, a good with subscript i means the one which agent i enjoys.
Following Hellwig (2005b), we consider the maximization of the social welfare
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function, using Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function as her objective. It is obvi-
ous that she faces the resource constraint. Let T : R → R be the income tax function,
and agent i’s budget constraint is written as ci = Yi − T (Yi). So, the government’s
income tax revenue is
T (YL) + T (YH) = YL − cL + YH − cH . (2)
We allow the government to provide public good with use-exclusion. Put it differ-
ently, it can impose user fees on those who enjoy public goods. Indicator B represents
individuals who obtain the benefits from a public good and indicator NB individuals

















1 if i = B
0 if i = NB
.
The assumption on the utility function is useful to avoid the multidimensional hetero-
geneity problem. Also, the government imposes admission fees p on those who access




= Yi − 1(i) · p − T (Yi).
4.2.1 Extensive Margin
Individuals decide whether or not to get access to a public good. Individuals with
type (θ, Yi) obtain utility θG + c
B
i















where θ̂ is interpreted as the net gain from being excluded from a public good. We
derive the equality in equation (27) using individual’s budget constraint. Equation
(27) means that, if public goods preferences of individuals are greater (lower) than the
threshold θ̂, they (do not) access to a public good. Moreover, it is rewritten as:
p = θ̂G (5)
That is, type i individuals prefer to make use of public good paying admission fees p if
the benefit θG that they draw from the enjoyment of a public good exceeds p.
4.2.2 The Government




p f (θ)dθ +
∑
i
T (Yi) = ϕ(G)





i ] = ϕ(G)
(6)
The first term is the aggregate revenue from admission fees. The second term represents
the aggregate revenue from income taxes. She produces the public good, using these
revenues. Following Hellwig (2005b), the social welfare function used in our analysis
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W(θG + cBH) f (θ)dθ +
∫ θ̂
θ




W(θG + cBL) f (θ)dθ +
∫ θ̂
θ




W(θG − θ̂G + cNBH ) f (θ)dθ +
∫ θ̂
θ




W(θG − θ̂G + cNBL ) f (θ)dθ +
∫ θ̂
θ
W(cNBL ) f (θ)dθ
(7)
where W is an increasing and concave function, that is, W ′ ≥ 0 and W ′′ ≤ 0.
In the second best environment, the government cannot observe initial wealth which
are private information of individuals. By revelation principle, it suffices to induce
individuals reveal their true types for initial endowment to maximize the objective of
the government. Since the government can observe whether or not to access to a public
good, they cannot mimic ones in the other group. Therefore, we consider only the
incentive constraint within each group, and have only to check the followings:
YH − T (YH) ≥ YH − T (YL) and YL − T (YL) ≥ YL − T (YH). (8)
Obviously, the government cannot set differential income taxes dependent on their rev-
elation, in other words, T (YH) = T (YL) = T . Also, the government takes envy with
respect to individuals’ utilities into consideration. Introducing the concept of Diaman-
taras and Thomson (1989), the government must implement an allocation satisfying
the following λ envy free constraint within each group3:
YL − T ≥ λ(YH − T ) (9)
3Of course, we must satisfy λ envy-free constraint for high-class, but for any λ, the envy-free constraint
for type H is satisfied whenever that for type L is satisfied.
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for NB group, and
YL − p − T ≥ λ(YH − p − T ) (10)
for B group. The inequality (9) holds if (10) is true, so it is enough to check inequality
(10) for this ethical requirement. Furthermore, rearranging (10),
YL − λYH ≥ (1 − λ)(T + p).
If λ > YL
YH
, (10) cannot hold vacuously since the right-hand side is non-negative, so we
assume that λ ≤ YL
YH
.
To sum up, the government chooses the policy {T, θ̂,G} to maximize the social
welfare function (7) subject to the government’s budget constraint (6), and the λ envy-
free constraint (10). The corresponding Lagrangian is
L(T,G, θ̂; γ, η) =W
+γ{2(1 − F(θ̂))θ̂G + 2T − ϕ(G)}
+η{YL − λYH − (1 − λ)(T + p)}
(11)
where γ and η are Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to constraints individually.
Using the first-order conditions with respect to the Lagrangian, we characterize the
optimal provision rule for public goods for the reduction of envy.
Proposition 6. Under nonlinear income tax, the optimal provision rule taking the re-


















W ′(θG − θ̂G + Yi − T ) f (θ)dθ +
∫ θ̂
θ








The provision rule (12) is analogous to that derived in Tsugawa and Obara (2017)
except for use exclusion. in the left hand, the first term is the sum of marginal rate
of substitution between income and public good, the second term side represents the
marginal benefit due to the increase in revenue from user fees, and the third term ex-
presses the marginal loss caused by the argument of envy owing to the increase of user
fees. These terms distort the level of public goods upwardly or downwardly, and the
effect depends on the level of user fees. Therefore, we examine the level of user fees.
Combining (A.1) with (A.2), the formula is characterized by:




︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
e f f iciency loss






















W′(θG−θ̂G+Yi−T ) f (θ)dθ
γ
. These are the marginal
social welfare weight for individuals with wealth level i in group j, and measure the
relative value of the government that gives an additional 1$ to type i j individuals.
Equation (14) implies an equity − efficiency tradeoff . A small reform, such that p
increases, distorts the decision making on the extensive margin. That is, individuals
with lower preferences for a public good tend to hope the exclusion of public goods.
Therefore, revenues from user fees decrease, which is expressed by the first term in the
left hand side. On the other hand, the right hand side is the net welfare gains from the
redistribution between groups, and the first and second terms describe the government’s
redistributive tastes for each group. If the government prefers to redistribute from group
B to NB, that is, the first term in the right-hand side is greater than the second term,
user fess are charged to increase revenues and raise consumption levels.
From equation (14), the equity gain crucially depends on the assumption on the
82
social welfare function. We suggest two polar cases: utilitarian and Rawlsian. If the
social welfare function is utilitarian, the equity gain is zero because the government is
not interested in the redistribution. This means that efficiency loss is always larger than
equity gain if the government imposes user fees. Therefore, p = 0 is optimal. On the
other hand, when the objective of the government is Rawlsian, the equity gain which is
equal to G(1−F(θ̂)) remains because the aim is to improve the utility of type-L agents.4
That is, the level of p is determined by the comparison between the loss and the gain.
However, not only interior solution but also a trivial case (p = 0 and G = 0) satisfies
equation (14). In the section, we focus only on the analytical result under the interior
solution, and compare the welfare level under the interior solution with that under the
trivial case in the numerical section.
On the occasion, we characterize the optimal provision rule for public goods under











(1 − F(θ̂))θ̂ +
η
γ




θ f (θ)dθ. Equation (15) is the optimal provision rule under utilitar-
ian and the result suggests that under-provision is optimal, which is consistent with
Proposition 1. On the other hand, equation (16) is that under Rawlsian. The envy term
distorts downwardly the level of public goods.
4The objective of the Rawlsian government is to maximize the worst-off individuals’ utility, i.e., YL − T .
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Social welfare (= xNB
L
) θ̂ G xNB
H
Case I
λ = .3 0.605106 0.962194 0.925822 1.60511
Case II
λ = .4 0.661546 0.939104 0.881917 1.66155
Case III
λ = .5 0.737788 0.903638 0.816464 1.73779
Table 4.1: Simulation results under Rawlsian
4.3 Numerical examples
To assess our theoretical results in terms of the provision of excludable public
goods, we present numerical example. The objective is to clarify the effect of λ, the de-
gree of envy, to the amount of public goods and the level of the user fee under Rawlsian
social welfare function.
In the simulation, we set the following assumptions. First, we assume that public
goods preferences θ are distributed as the uniform function F(θ) = θ/θ on the interval
[0, θ = 1]. Second, individuals are categorized into YL = 1 and YH = 2. Third, the
cost function for providing public good is denoted by G2. Finally, we assume that
πH = πL = 0.5 and λ = 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5.
We can check those results in Table 1. According to that, as λ increases, both user
fee and the level of public provision decrease. In addition, the threshold of whether
individuals utilize public goods or not decreases when the intensity of envy λ increases.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze optimal public good provision by a government when
she is concerned with ethical constraint, reduction of envy, and able to utilize both
lump-sum transfer and user fee as a way of exclusion. As the new constraint, we adopt
λ envy free constraint borrowed from Diamantaras and Thomson (1989), and derive
the optimal provision rule with user fee when the government has Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function under constraints on reduction of envy for agents with low
income. Also, we conduct numerical simulation for optimal policy by Rawlsian gov-
ernment with different levels of the degree of envy λ. Our model employs the similar
technique of introducing use exclusion to Hellwig (2005b), so we do not consider en-
dogenous labour incomes, but heterogeneous initial wealth, which is different from
Hellwig (2005b) as well as that ethical constraint.
The level of provision is determined by trade-off between efficiency loss and equity
gain. Note that this is parallel to Hellwig (2005b) except for the nouveau part coming
from λ envy free constraint. As the user fee increases, the efficiency loss also increases
or λ-equitability constraint becomes tighter. In addition to these policies in general, we
examine the two extreme cases: utilitarian or Rawlsian policymaker. In utilitarian case,
the optimal surcharge must be 0 since the equity gain also equals 0 while public good
is always provided. On the other hand, in Rawlsian case, there are two possible cases:
the provision is implemented with positive user fee or no provision. Analytically, we
cannot find which is better, but we simulate the proficiency numerically. According to
our simulation result, Rawlsian government provides public good with user fee exclud-
ing agents who evaluate it less. Additionally, the level of public provision and user fee
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also decreases as the intensity of envy increases. Such results are parallel to those in
numerical simulation part of our other work Tsugawa and Obara (2017).
In the end, there are two policy implications in our model. First of all, in paying
attention to reduction of envy, the government must deal with the envied λ-scale bundle
relative to the original bundle. Second, in Rawlsian policymaker’s mitigating envy, she
utilizes use exclusion. Finally, we think It interesting to remove the implicit assump-
tion that λ-equitability binds. As λ sufficiently small, this constraint will not bind, so










W ′(θG−θ̂G+Yi−T ) f (θ)dθ+
∫ θ̂
θ




















(θ− θ̂)W ′(θG− θ̂G+Yi−T ) f (θ)dθ+γ2(1−F(θ̂))θ̂−γϕ
′(G)+ηθ̂(λ−1) = 0
(A.3)
By rearranging (A.1) and (A.3), we obtain (13) and (12) respectively.
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Chapter 5
Income tax competition with
endogenous wages
5.1 Introduction
In the context of optimal income taxation, a government levies income taxes to
earners with high ability more progressively than those with the low, and the reason
is that she collects salaries from richer taxpayers and provides those poorer with col-
lected taxes. However, in the literatures, we assume that all citizens cannot emigrate
from the state or country because of their complaints about her tax policies whereas,
in reality, many high skilled workers are demanded in their fields all over the world,
and have chances to work in other places. Even though there are several obstacles to
migrate from home to the other like language skills, the moving costs have gradually
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but steadily decreased for a long time by technology progress and internationalization.
From the above reasons, we should consider the optimal fiscal policy under the
threat of migration as tax competitions by competing governments to attract more tax-
payers from outside as well as to keep their citizens. We must care for the change of
not only the number of populations paying taxes to an administration, but also wages
for their labor supply there. If two governments compete with each other, and one of
the two attracts workers by reducing their tax burden, the population must increase and
at the same time, their wages vary responding to the overall fraction of labor supply
or demand. Since the marginal tax rate at optimal income tax partially depends on
the workers’ wage, it’s more useful to consider the setup of competitive optimal taxa-
tion with their unit wage determined endogenously. Also, in reality, such demographic
changes and the structure of wages interact, and both of those have causal connection
to fiscal policies. On the other hand, past works ignore the endogeneity, but it is natural
extension to incorporate endogenous wages and its general equilibrium effect into tax
competition model.
To sum up, this paper sheds light on two aspects which existing works ignore; tax
competition in the framework of optimal nonlinear income tax and wages determined
by the overall productivity. In order to compare these two effects on tax policies, we
study the four cases: non-competing governments with or without endogenous wages,
competition by two identical governments with fixed wages and endogenous ones. Ex-
cept for the last, we review previous works in step with our novel setting, mobility of
workers and endogenous wage. In our new setup, we show that the optimal income tax
schedule embraces not only migration effect, but also trickle-down effect coming from
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endogenous wage, and the marginal tax rate depends on these two complementarily. In
the tax rate for high-skilled workers in our new setup, the impact of emigration never
disappears whereas that does in fixed wage cases. Why such difference arises is that
such terms are built into production technology as the part of populations even though
they vanish at symmetric equilibria.
Related literature
Much attention has been devoted to the analysis of optimal income taxation with
mobile labor under strategic competitions between governments. For instance, Piaser
(2007) studies nonlinear income tax competition by two benevolent governments in
the presence of labor mobility, but in a model with only two skills. In contrast to con-
tributions about tax competition like Wilson (1992) and Simula and Trannoy (2010)1,
Piaser (2007) adopts common agency model under asymmetric information based on
competitive nonlinear pricing model with random participation like Rochet and Stole
(2002) to study nonlinear income tax competition by competing two governments. Our
model is relevant to this, but the main difference is that we take into consideration that
each worker’s unit wage is endogenously determined by the overall productivity, and
the proportion depends on the ratio of populations in each class. Morelli et al. (2012b)
also studies nonlinear income tax competition by competing two tax authorities, and
they consider three classes of workers. Their main question is whether each class is
1With Simula and Trannoy (2012), they analyze income tax competition and its migration effect on
marginal tax rate in the context of optimal income tax model with participation constraints for workers.
Krause (2017) also examine a simple dynamic nonlinear income tax model without commitment in this
framework.
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in favor of unified tax authority or competitive tax authority, and they show that the
highest class always prefers the competitive one while the lowest class always prefers
the unified one. In addition, they show that the preferences of the middle class depend
on the initial conditions in terms of the distribution of abilities, the relative power of
the various classes, and mobility costs.
Lehmann et al. (2014) also studies nonlinear income tax competition by competing
two governments strategically. Compared to the above literatures, they consider more
general setting: continuous skill distribution and asymmetric two authorities in terms of
the populations. They derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium,
extending the Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) formula and show that the level and
the slope of the semi elasticity of migration are crucial to derive the shape of optimal
marginal income tax analytically. Following the framework of competitive nonlinear
pricing with random participation, they solve the problem by tax perturbation approach.
Bierbrauer et al. (2013) investigates strategic tax competition problem, but differ-
ently assume that all workers are perfectly mobile and that governments maximize the
average utility of their residents while some of the papers assume those maximizing
their utility with the lowest skill. Their results also support race-to-the-bottom the-
sis, which means that at the equilibrium, the highest skilled workers receive the ben-
efits funded by taxes on lower skilled ones. We also refer Lipatov and Weichenrieder
(2015) and Tóbiás (2016) as recent developments in nonlinear income tax competition
by strategically competing tax authorities. Lipatov and Weichenrieder (2015) analyzes
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two tax-
payer populations, and Tóbiás (2016) considers more than two competing governments
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and obtains the converse result of race-to-the-bottom result.
Likewise, my model stands in the line of optimal income taxation with wages en-
dogenously determined by the proportion of workers. Stiglitz (1982) studies Pareto
efficient income taxation with endogenous wage, and derives the marginal tax rate at
optimum. Sachs et al. (2016) generalizes the wage distribution into the continuous
one, and studies the incidence and the optimal design of nonlinear income taxes in a
economy of Mirrlees (1971). Micheletto (2004) sheds light on mixed taxation in this
framework, and Gaube (2005b) shows that production efficiency is violated in the opti-
mum with both non-linear and linear income taxation if and only if a distortionary tax
schedule is implemented.
In what follows, next section introduces basic framework of the study, and Section
3 addresses the optimal tax schedule without endogenous wage and mobility of workers
as benchmark. Section 4 and 5 add the structures of the mobility and wages determined
by overall productivity independently, and Section 6 derives the optimal tax schedule
with both mobile workers and endogenous wages.
5.2 The model
In this model, we consider an economy consisting of two states, indexed by i = 1, 2.
Taxpayers live in the either state i, and each state has one population of taxpayers. Let
pi be the proportion of taxpayers with high ability for state i. In addition, they have
locational preferences that are uniformly distributed between [0, 1], and the distribution
is independent from ability. Taxpayers who leave from their own state to the other pay
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k per unit, so if they are located at m, and move to the other state, they must pay (1−m)k
as their cost of moving.
Taxpayers consume numeraire b and incur disutility from labor supply l. Assume
that their utility are separable between consumption and labor supply, so they have
the utility U(b, l) = u(b) − l where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave in b.
They earn their income from labor supply, and each state government can levy taxes
only on their labor income. Let y be the labor income, the product of ability and labor




productivity (or unit wage) w and before-tax income y, their utility can be rewritten as




In our model, it is assumed that there are two types of their productivities: wH and wL
with wH > wL.
Tax schedule and timing of tax competition game
Each state government i sets nonlinear income tax Ti(y). We assume that each state
cannot discriminate the tax burden between their native state. If no taxpayer moves
from their own state, and comes from the other state, government i faces the following
budget constraint;
pi{yi(wH) − Bi(wH)
︸              ︷︷              ︸
=Ti(yi(wH ))
} + (1 − pi){yi(wL) − Bi(wL)
︸             ︷︷             ︸
=Ti(yi(wL))
} ≥ 0 (1)
where yi(wa) is the labor income for taxpayers with ability a and Bi(wa) is the labor
income for taxpayers with ability a for a = H, L.
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We introduce the tax competition game between two states. It is assumed that all
taxpayers can move, so once they decide which state to live in, they also decide the
state where they pay all taxes. First of all, in the environment of competitive mecha-
nism design, it is not without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct contracts2.
Hereafter, for simplicity, we assume that the two governments are symmetric or iden-
tical, so p1 = p2 = p > 0.
The timing of the tax competition game is as follows: in the first stage, each state
i chooses its menu of contracts Ti(·). We assume that the two states have no asymmet-
ric information, so each tax authority knows the distribution of workers and that of its
commuting cost. Next, each citizen decides one state where he lives given these con-
tracts. Citizens who move from their own state incur moving costs, so they maximize
their utilities given the expense. Applying revelation principle in this setting, each gov-
ernment equivalently decides the menu of allocations: {Yi(w), Bi(w)}w. Therefore, we
can summarize the timeline as follows:
1. Each state chooses its menu {Yi(w), Bi(w)}w,
2. Given these contracts, each citizen decides the location where he lives,
3. Allocations are determined according to the menu of contracts announced at time
1.
In order to describe the migration decision, we denote citizen’s rent in their home
with wa by va, and her rent in emigrating and staying at the other state by v
∗
a. The
2According to Martimort and Stole (2002), revelation principle can be applied as long as we consider
only pure strategy equilibria.
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proportion m of taxpayers in one state stay at home where






It is obvious for taxpayers with wa to stay at her home state if va ≥ v
∗
a. Otherwise, the
citizens may move to another state, and for ability a = H, L, the proportion of paying
taxes to state i is






because m is uniformly distributed along Hoteling line [0, 1]. Including their migration
decision, each authority i faces the modified budget constraint:
pmi(wH)(Yi(wH) − Bi(wH)) + (1 − p)mi(wL)(Yi(wL) − Bi(wL)) ≥ 0 (3)
where mi(wa) is the fraction of taxpayers with wa who pay taxes to state i. Also,
the government extracts true information from the taxpayers, and because of single-









With or without strategic tax competition, each government can offer the above incen-
tive constrained contract only. Given tax schedule T1 and T2, taxpayer with ability wa
, working at i, solves the following problem about before-tax income
max
y




So, the marginal tax rate at y is determined by
(1 − T ′i (y)) × u
′(y − Ti(y))










where MRS yb is the marginal rate of substitution between before-tax income y and
numeraire or pre-tax income b.
5.3 Benchmark 1: optimal tax schedule under exoge-
nous wage and without labor mobility
In this section, we derive the optimal income tax schedule under exogenous wage,
but we do not allow all taxpayers to move from their home state. State i maximizes the
taxpayers’ utility for low ability: vL subject to the resource constraint (1) and downward


















where γ and λ are the multipliers of constraints (1) and (4) respectively. Differentiating
it with respect to Yi(wH), Yi(wL), Bi(wH) and Bi(wL), we can obtain the FOCs:
Bi(wH) : λu
′(Bi(wH)) − γp = 0
Bi(wL) : (1 − λ)u
′(Bi(wL)) − γ(1 − p) = 0
Yi(wH) : − λ
1
wH







+ γ(1 − p) = 0
Thus, we derive the following properties of allocation {Bi(wa),Yi(wa)}a=H,L as the fol-
lowing proposition:
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Lemma 2. If taxpayers have no mobility, and fixed unit wage, and the government has




















(Yi(wL)) > 0 : disposable
income is distorted from the first best.
• Bi(wH) > Bi(wL): disposable income for wH is higher than that for wL.
This result is analogous to that in Stiglitz (1982)3. In order to find the degree of





















1 − F p
and T ′i (Yi(wL)) =
p(F − 1)
1 − p
where F is the ratio of unit wages wH
wL
> 1. So, the marginal tax rate at Yi(wL) must
increase as F increases. In addition, the tax burden for taxpayers with high ability is
larger than that for those with low ability.
Lemma 3. If taxpayers have no mobility, and fixed unit wage, and the government has
Rawlsian preference, then
• the marginal tax rate T ′
i
(Yi(wL)) increases as the wage ratio F increases.
3Here, we only take downward incentive constraint into consideration. Of course, we may incorporate
upward incentive constraint, but it is sufficient to focus only on downward incentive constraint because the






where T ia = Yi(wa) − Bi(wa).
for a = H, L and i = 1, 2





the incentive constraint binds,
u(Bi(wH)) − u(Bi(wL)) =
1
wH











However, this contradicts the fact that Bi(wH) = arg maxB{u(B) −
B
wH
} and Bi(wH) >






Also, if T i
H
< 0, the government budget constraint is violated, so we must have
T i
L
< 0 < T i
H
. When taxpayers are not allowed to move from their home country to the
other, the government levies taxes on rich ones, and gives subsidies to poor ones.
5.4 Benchmark 2: optimal tax schedule under exoge-
nous wage and with labor mobility
Next, we check the optimal tax schedule with their labor mobility under exogenous
wage. In this case, we stick to the conditions that va ≤ v
∗
a for any tax authority and
wage level a. Also, since we cling to symmetric equilibria in tax competition games,
we leave out the index of tax authority i.
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Note that the derivatives of fraction of which populations pay taxes to that tax authority















′(B(wH)) − γp{m(wH) −
u′(B(wH))
k
(Y(wH) − B(wH))} = 0
B(wL) :(1 − λ)u
′(B(wL)) − γ(1 − p){m(wL) −
u′(B(wL))
k
(Y(wL) − B(wL))} = 0













+ γ(1 − p){m(wL) −
1
wLk
(Y(wL) − B(wL))} = 0
Again, since these governments have the same proportion of skilled and unskilled
taxpayers, and they have no tax revenue requirement, it’s enough to restrict atten-












for any ability a. Hence, at symmetric equilibria, m(wa) = 1




, and by similar argument in
Lemma 2, we can show that T m
L
< 0 < T m
H




a for a = H, L.
The properties of allocation under such conditions can de described as the following
lemma:
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Lemma 4. If taxpayers are mobile, and have their fixed unit wage, and the government


























> 0 for all i = 1, 2: upward
distortion on top.
In order to find progressivity of the tax schedule, we obtain from those FOCs:
γ =
1
wL − (F −1 pT
m
H








wL − (F −1 pT
m
H








for all k > 0, and as k goes to infinity, γ and λ get the same ones as those in Benchmark
1. Therefore, the tax schedule comes close to one in Benchmark 1 when emigration
cost is so high that few ones can exit from home country and work in another one, and
according to the multipliers γ and λ, each tax authority attracts taxpayers with high
skill and incurs more burden to those with low-skill as k decreases.
5.5 Benchmark 3: Optimal tax schedule under endoge-
nous wage and without labor mobility
From now on, we introduce aggregate production technology to decide the wage
level endogenously. Here, we assume that the each tax authority has one technology
respectively, but that these two are identical. Let F(ZL,ZH) be the production technol-
ogy for each state where Za is the total labor supply for ability a, and it is assumed that
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F is strictly increasing, strictly concave and constant return to scale, so F(αZL, αZH) =
αF(ZL,ZH) for all (ZL,ZH) ∈ R
2
+ and α > 0, and F1(ZL,ZH), F2(ZL,ZH) > 0, F11(ZL,ZH) <
0 and F22(ZL,ZH) < 0 for any (ZL,ZH) ∈ R
2
+.
For each class a, wage level per unit wa is determined by the marginal product for
labor supply: wL = F1(ZL,ZH) and wH = F2(ZL,ZH). Since F is constant return to
scale, F(ZL,ZH) = ZLF(1,
ZH
ZL
), and let f ( ZH
ZL
) ≡ F(1, ZH
ZL
). Using f , the wage level for
each class is determined by




where z is the ratio of aggregate labor supply between two classes, z = ZH
ZL
.
As benchmark case, we derive the optimal tax schedule without labor mobility.
Each wage level is determined by the marginal product for total labor supply, but tax-
payers are not allowed to move from their home state to the other. In describing the
self-selection constraint, taxpayers with high ability wH who mimic the low ones work
for earning wLQL where Qa is the labor supply for each worker with ability a, so the











is the ratio of total labor supply between two classes, and ϕ(·) is
the unit wage or productivity ratio. In this economy, the amount of total consumption
pBH + (1 − p)BL comes from the production F((1 − p)QL, pQH). Thus, the resource
constraint is written by
F((1 − p)QL, pQH) − pBH − (1 − p)BL ≥ 0.
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u(BL) − QL subject to




F((1 − p)QL, pQH) − pBH − (1 − p)BL ≥ 0
(7)
Let λ and γ be the Lagrangian multipliers of self-selection constraint and resource
constraint. The FOCs are:
BL : (1 − λ)u
′(BL) − γ(1 − p) = 0
BH : λu
′(BH) − γp = 0









)) + γ(1 − p)F1((1 − p)QL, pQH) = 0






)) + γpF2((1 − p)QL, pQH) = 0.
(8)
Rearranging this, the disposable income for high ability BH and the marginal tax rate









F2((1 − p)QL, pQH)
<
1
F2((1 − p)QL, pQH)









< 0 where YH is the before-tax labour income,
as ϕ′(·) > 0. The variation of wage ratio weighted by population ratio play a crucial




income BH also increases, and this result is different from fixed wage cases. Similarly,
those with type H face negative marginal tax rate, and the absolute value increases as




















F1((1 − p)QL, pQH)
>
1

























is the elasticity of substitution and YL is the before-
tax labour income. The disposable income BL depends on the elasticity σ and wage
ratio ϕ. As the wage ratio or the elasticity increases, BL decreases. Again, the gen-
eral equilibrium effect as well as self-selection effect distort the disposable allocation
from the first best. Summarizing the argument, we state the following lemma about
properties of the optimal allocation.
Lemma 5. If taxpayers are not mobile but their wage is determined by marginal pro-
ductivity of aggregate production, and the government has Rawlsian preference, then
the allocation {Bea,Q
e














: upward distortion caused by the vari-













: downward distortion caused by
the wage ratio and the elasticity of substitution
• T ′(YH) < 0 and T





is the elasticity of substitution for wage ratio.
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5.6 Optimal tax schedule under endogenous wage and
with labor mobility
We derive the optimal tax policy with endogenous wage and labor mobility. In the
same manner as Section 4, we assume that taxpayers are able to move from their own
state to the other, and they incur the cost (1 − x)k in leaving from their state where x is
their locational preference between [0, 1] which is uniformly distributed, and k ∈ R++
is the marginal cost for emigration. Also, their wage is determined by the marginal
product in the country where they work. So, two assumptions in models discussed
above are combined.
Here, we assume that these two states are symmetric: they have the same population




u(BL) − QL subject to
F((1 − p)mLQL, pmH QH) − pmH BH − (1 − p)mLBL ≥ 0 and










+γ{F((1 − p)mLQL, pmH QH) − pmH BH − (1 − p)mLBL}
(10)
At symmetric equilibria, mL = mH = 1 because their utilities between two states are
equal for each class. Differentiating it with respect to BH , BL,QH and QL and rearrang-
ing the FOCs4, we obtain properties of the optimal allocation, and those are summa-
4The FOCs and its derivations are left in Appendix.
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rized as the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If taxpayers are mobile, their wage is determined by marginal productiv-
ity of aggregate production, and the two symmetric governments have Rawlsian pref-

















F2((1 − p)QL, pQH)
⇔T ′(YmeH ) < 0
(11)
upward distortion caused by the variation of wage ratio and negative marginal



















F1((1 − p)QL, pQH)
and T ′(YmeL ) > 0
(12)
downward distortion caused by the wage ratio and the elasticity of substitution.
According to Theorem 1, we can find that trickle down effect caused by general
equilibrium distorts the optimal allocation from the first best, which is similar to the
labor-immobile cases.
Also, we can see that the labor mobility results in the distortion. Rearranging the



























= F2((1 − p)QL, pQH)QH − BH . Because of the self-selection constraint,
T em
H
> 0, following the argument in Lemma 2. On top of that, ϕ′(
pQH
(1−p)QL
) > 0. There-
fore, λ
γ
distorted downwardly as k increases, and at the extreme cases, if k goes to
infinity, u′(Bem
H
) becomes identical to u′(Be
H
). It is different from fixed-wage cases that
the degree of labor mobility effect k depends on endogenous wage effect ϕ′(·). Accord-
ing to the ratio of these multipliers, the denominator contains
ϕ′(·)
k
, so both marginal
cost of moving k and the sensitivity of wage ratio toward that of total labor supply ϕ′(·)
play an important role in allocation Bem
H
. The intuition is as follows; if the marginal
cost k decreases, more taxpayers living in one state come to the other state, and it also
increases the wage ratio ϕ(·) due to decreasing the marginal productivity for skilled
labor supply. In a nutshell, emigration terms mH and mL are built into the production
technology F. Even though mL = mH = 1 at symmetric equilibria, any marginal exit
effects do not disappear. The argument can be applied to u′(Bme
L
) or T ′(Yem
L
). If low-
skilled taxpayers are more likely to move, then the number of them increases while the
unit wage decreases. So, the wage ratio ϕ(·) decreases, and it distorts their disposable
income downwardly. By the same token, the marginal tax rate increases as k increases,
which lead to that λ
γ
decreases.
Summarizing the discussions, the next proposition claims the effects of moving
cost k and general equilibrium or trickle-down ϕ′(·) on the marginal tax rates.
Proposition 7. According to the tax schedules derived in Theorem 1,
• About T ′(Yem
H
), the marginal tax rate comes close to 0 as emigration cost k in-
creases or the threat of their emigration becomes weaker. In an analogous way,
the tax rate for low-class T ′(Yem
L
) decreases as that threat becomes weaker.
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5.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate nonlinear income tax competition between two com-
peting governments with mobile high-skilled or low-skilled workers, and derive the
tax schedules at symmetric equilibria, in particular, focusing on the marginal tax rate
for each class. Our novelty is to introduce not only mobility for all taxpayers, but
also endogenous wages determined by marginal productivities at national level, and in
this setting, we obtain the marginal tax rate for each skill. Compared to tax schemes
for labor mobility but fixed wages, we show that the equilibrium marginal tax rate
which high-skilled workers face contains migration threat effect k as well as general
equilibrium one, so the sign must be negative and the slope be affected by marginal
emigration cost k. Also, as the ones become immobile, the marginal tax rates for all
classes become closer to those for models with endogenous wages but not embracing
labor mobility. In a similar fashion, the marginal tax rates near those with exogenous
wages and incorporating taxpayers’ emigration when the general equilibrium effect or
the variation of wage ratio with regard to the fraction of workers within one country
ϕ′(·) decreases. Intuitively, since emigration effects are embedded with each tax au-
thority’s production technology as well as the resource constraint, the marginal cost for
moving k does not completely vanish in the marginal tax rate for high-class. On top of
that, such emigration terms within productivity lead to the impact that marginal effects
of changes in their wages become stronger as threats of their leaving increase.
In all benchmark cases, we review models and its results studied in existing lit-
eratures, which are beneficial for analyzing our new model in comparison to them.
Without general equilibrium effect, high-skilled workers never face non-zero marginal
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tax rates while low-skilled ones always face positive marginal tax rates, and the pro-
gressivity of taxation depends on how low their emigration cost is and how large the
variation of wage ratio toward the fraction of taxpayers and the wage disparity are. If
such pay gaps and changes are high, the tax rates for low class must increase, and their
disposable incomes must decrease. Due to trickle-down and migration effects, each tax
authority is reluctant to collect taxes from high skilled workers in order to attract them;
instead, she cannot redistribute lots of collected incomes from high class to low class.
Especially, in our new kind of model, their threat of relocation, which does not appear
in the marginal tax rate for high skilled workers in the setup with exogenous wages,
emerges in the tax rate for those.
In the end, we leave several several future works we have to unveil. At first, we find
the directions of marginal tax rates in our novel setting, but never completely clarify
the impacts of general equilibrium part and moving cost on the tax schedules. In order
to figure out such unsolved questions, we should conduct more analytical studies and
numerical simulations like papers studying optimal taxation with general equilibrium
effect5. Another is to generalize our setups. For instance, like Lehmann et al. (2014)
and Lipatov and Weichenrieder (2015), we have the space to introduce asymmetric-
ity of two tax authorities about demographic composition and production technology.
Though such generalization makes much more difficult to solve the model, we must
obtain more findings about equilibrium outcomes of tax competitions which are closer
to events in reality. Considering asymmetric settings as well as symmetric settings,
characterizing all equilibria in such tax competitions is also nice for future research.
5For example, see Jacobs (2013) about numerical simulation.
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Apart from our model, nonlinear income tax competition model can be applied to tax
authorities’ competition problems for attracting international firms or entrepreneurs6.
Appendix: FOCs under endogenous wage and labor mo-
bility
First of all, differentiating Lagrangian (10) with respect to BH , BL, QH and QL, we































+ γ[(1 − p)
u′(BL)
k


































+ γ{(1 − p)(1 −
QL
k




In order to derive T ′(Yme
H
) < 0 and T ′(Yme
L
) > 0, we multiply the first two equations by
u′(BH) and u(BL) respectively, and rearrange those with the remaining two equations.
Also, for the purpose of obtaining λ
γ
, we utilize the FOCs with respect to QH and QL.
6For instance, see Olsen and Osmundsen (2001) and Boyer and Kempf (2017).
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